Contention, Controversy, and Change. Evolutions and Revolutions in the Jewish Experience. Volume 2
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Издательство:
Academic Studies Press
Год издания: 2016
Кол-во страниц: 261
Дополнительно
Вид издания:
Монография
Уровень образования:
Дополнительное профессиональное образование
ISBN: 978-1-61811-465-5
Артикул: 694182.02.99
Conflict and change are fundamental elements of social reality and of the Jewish historical experience. This collection presents the work of a distinguished group of scholars exploring the themes of social, political, religious, intellectual, and institutional movements and change in Jewish history. These scholars demonstrate that social change throughout Jewish life has assumed many different manifestations, and can occur in revolutionary and dramatic ways as well as in more common gradual and evolutionary processes. In the first volume, the essays revolve around two themes: "Mobilizations and Contentious Politics,” and "Social Trends, Communal and Institutional Change.” The second volume is devoted to "Developments in Philosophy, Ideology, and Religious Practice.” Taken together, these two volumes present scholarship rich with both historical and contemporary relevance, of interest to academics and students in Jewish studies and the social sciences, communal leaders and policy makers, and anyone intrigued by the Jewish experience.
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VOLUME II CONTENTION, CONTROVERSY, AND CHANGE Evolutions and Revolutions in the Jewish Experience
Touro College Press
VOLUME II New York ERIC LEVINE Editors CONTENTION, CONTROVERSY, AND CHANGE Evolutions and Revolutions in the Jewish Experience
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data: A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN 978-1-61811-464-8 (hardback) ISBN 978-1-61811-465-5 (electronic) ©Touro College Press, 2016 Published by Touro College Press and Academic Studies Press. Typeset, printed and distributed by Academic Studies Press. Cover design by Ivan Grave Touro College Press Michael A. Shmidman and Simcha Fishbane, Editors 27 West 23rd Street New York, NY 10010 USA www.touro.edu/news/publications/touro-college-press/ Academic Studies Press 28 Montfern Avenue Brighton, MA 02135 USA press@academicstudiespress.com www.academicstudiespress.com
IV. Developments in Philosophy, Ideology, and Religious Practice Moses Mendelssohn’s Humanism Michah Gottlieb ..............................................................................................................3 The Roots of Satmar Anti-Zionism: Rabbi Joel Teitelbaum, Zionism, and Hungarian Ultra-Orthodoxy Zvi Jonathan Kaplan....................................................................................................21 The Late Zionism of Nathan Birnbaum: The Herzl Controversy Reconsidered Jess Olson.........................................................................................................................37 Trade Unions, Strikes, and the Renewal of Halakhic Labor Law: Ideologies in the Rulings of Rabbis Kook, Uziel, and Feinstein Benjamin Brown............................................................................................................82 Rabbinic Stories: History or Fiction? Herbert Basser.............................................................................................................119 Behind the Purim Mask: The Symbolic Representation of the Rituals and Customs of Purim Simcha Fishbane.........................................................................................................135 Table of Contents VOLUME II
Table of Contents vi Back to the Yeshiva: The Social Dynamics of an Orthodox Sabbath Morning Service Simcha Fishbane.........................................................................................................206 Historical Time and Liminal Time: A Chapter in Rabbinic Historiosophy Nissan Rubin..............................................................................................................219
Developments in Philosophy, Ideology, and Religious Practice PART IV
Moses Mendelssohn’s Humanism* In his landmark book, A Secular Age (2007), Charles Taylor defines a secular age as one in which “the eclipse of all goals beyond human flourishing . . . falls within the range of an imaginable life for masses of people.”1 The story of how this possibility (which Taylor calls “exclusive humanism”) became a widely available option is a long one, but for Taylor it winds through a crucial “intermediate form” that he calls “providential deism.”2 Providential deism, whose heyday was in the eighteenth century, is a complex phenomenon, but I would like to focus on one aspect of Taylor’s treatment of it. For Taylor, providential deism is marked by what he calls an “anthropocentric shift.”3 Taylor sees this exemplified in the work of the early eighteenth-century English deist Matthew Tindal. In his Christianity as Old as the Creation (1730), Tindal argues that our only duty to God is the promotion of human happiness. Tindal reasons that since God is absolutely self-sufficient, God could never require anything from us. God created the world from pure benevolence in order for human beings to be happy, and as such, the only service that God desires is the promotion of human happiness. Taylor bristles at this doctrine, noting that “an observer * An earlier version of this paper was given at a Moses Mendelssohn conference organized by Reinier Munk in Amsterdam in December 2009, and portions of it subsequently appeared in my 2011 book Faith and Freedom: Moses Mendelssohn’s Theological-Political Thought (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011). 1 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 19–20. 2 Ibid., 18. 3 Ibid., 221.
today looks with stupefaction on this pre-shrunk religion.”4 For Taylor, it is clear that both faithful Christians and exclusive humanists would inevitably reject providential deism. By identifying the goal of religion with happiness and seeing religious duty as a way of furthering self-interest, providential deists marginalized God’s role in the individual’s life. According to Taylor, this led to the abandonment of providential deism in two directions—faithful Christians rejected providential deism as insufficiently attentive to the role of grace and mystery in religion, while exclusive humanists took the small step of eliminating God as a superfluous hypothesis. One of the most prominent eighteenth-century providential deists was Moses Mendelssohn. Taylor never mentions Mendelssohn, but I question whether God is so easily subtracted from Mendelssohn’s humanism. To be sure, Mendelssohn makes worldly human flourishing a central concern, but he also considers religion a crucial means for attaining this end. For Mendelssohn, a proper appreciation of our finite humanity does not lead us away from God, but rather to recognition of the infinite divine. I will illustrate this by examining aspects of Mendelssohn’s theology, ethics, politics, epistemology, and metaphysics. But before I begin, I present a couple of caveats. First, as I will be following a thread through different areas of Mendelssohn’s thought, I will not be able to undertake a detailed analysis of particular texts. Second, there are other areas of Mendelssohn’s thought that could contribute to this analysis, especially his aesthetics, but I will leave discussion of them to another occasion. I. Theology I begin with an important element of Mendelssohn’s theology, namely his treatment of eternal punishment. While Mendelssohn sees himself as a proponent of Leibniz’s enlightened theism, Mendelssohn emphatically rejects Leibniz’s defense of eternal punishment.5 For Mendelssohn, Leibniz 4 Ibid., 226. 5 Recent scholars debate whether Leibniz sincerely believed in eternal punishment. For a recent account of the debate including a strong defense of the sincerity of Leibniz’s belief in eternal punishment, see Lloyd Strickland, “Leibniz on Eternal Punishment,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17, no. 2 (2009): 307–331. Lessing famously defended the sincerity of Leibniz’s belief in this doctrine and Mendelssohn apparently accepted Leibniz’s sincerity, though Mendelssohn does not engage with Lessing’s interpretation of what Leibniz meant. For