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The Codification of Jewish Law and an Introduction to the Jurisprudence of the Mishna Berura

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The Mishna Berura is, without a doubt, Rabbi Israel Meir Kagan's greatest and most complex contribution to the canon of Orthodox Jewish Law; it is a singular work that synthesizes Jewish traditions, laws, and mores into a practical halakhic guide to daily religious life. For all of his traditionalism, Rabbi Kagan was an iconoclast, and the Mishna Berura broke from many of the traditional approaches of deciding halakhic directives. Instead, he favored studying, engaging, and asserting decisions in a nuanced, almost natural approach to how ethical people should live their daily lives consistent with Jewish law. Today, the Mishna Berura has gained widespread recognition and is considered authoritative by essentially all of contemporary Orthodox Jewry, a measure of greatness that few works of Halakha have attained. Michael J. Broyde and Ira Bedzow here investigate this seminal text and explore its background and decision-making process.
Broyde, M. The Codification of Jewish Law and an Introduction to the Jurisprudence of the Mishna Berura : монография / M. Broyde, I. Bedzow. – Boston : Academic Studies Press, 2014. - 397 с. – ISBN 978-1-61811-279-8. - Текст : электронный. - URL: https://znanium.ru/catalog/product/2240289 (дата обращения: 19.11.2026). – Режим доступа: по подписке.
Фрагмент текстового слоя документа размещен для индексирующих роботов
and an
Introduction to the
Jurisprudence of the Mishna Berura




Boston 2014
The Codification of 
Jewish Law
and an
Introduction to the
Jurisprudence of the 
Mishna Berura
Michael J. Broyde and Ira Bedzow


Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data:
A catalog record for this title is available from the Library of Congress.
Copyright ©2014 Academic Studies Press
All rights reserved
Cover design by Ivan Grave
ISBN 978-1-61811-278-1 (hardback)
ISBN 978-1-61811-279-8 (ebook)
Published by Academic Studies Press in 2014
28 Montfern Avenue
Brighton, MA 02135, USA
press@academicstudiespress.com
www.academicstudiespress.com


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
​M
any people have contributed in different ways to the writing of this 
book and we would like to thank them:
Thank you to the Center for the Study of Law and Religion, the Law 
School and the Tam Institute of Jewish studies, all at Emory University, who 
supported us in writing this work, and the editors at Hamline Law Review 
for reviewing and publishing an earlier version of portions of this book as 
an article.
We particularly also want to thank Jerry and Chaya Weinberger, who 
supported our work in dedication to their son’s, Shmuel’s, bar mitzvah. 
Their support was a demonstration of the ideal that parents wish for their 
children to continue to grow and study works of Torah and Halakha, and 
that their learning enhances their practice and observance.
We would like to thank the many different people who helped with 
production of the manuscript. In particular, Sharona Vedol of Academic 
Studies Press helped us in many different ways. Thank you as well to Leah 
Levy, Judah Berger, and Avraham Lewis, who proofread various parts of 
this work. Many people—too many to name and thank individually—read 
different portions of this work, and we are grateful to each of them.
M ost importantly, each of us has been privileged to be married to 
wonderful women without whose patience, love, affection, and kindness 
we would be lost, and we dedicate this book to Channah S. Broyde and 
Rachel Johanna Bedzow. We are both truly blessed to be married to women 
who have supported us in so many ways. “The heart of her husband safely 
trusts in her, and [therefore] he has no lack of gain.”




TABLE OF CONTENTS
	
Acknowledgments........................................................................................v
and an Introduction to the Jurisprudence of the Mishna Berura
I.	
General Methodology of Codification of Jewish Law..................................... 1
II.	
History of Codification..................................................................................6
III.	
Introduction to Rabbi Israel Meir Kagan and the Mishna Berura................ 18
IV.	
Mishna Berura’s Philosophy of Jewish Law................................................. 23
V.	
Mishna Berura’s Jurisprudence................................................................... 27
VI.	
The Mishna Berura’s Technique of Legal Interpretation.............................. 61
VII.	 The Mishna Berura’s Use of Key Terms........................................................ 65
VIII.	 Examples of the Mishna Berura’s Methodology..........................................69
(A)	
Adding a New Dimension to Resolve a Disagreement................................. 72
	
Example 1—Androgynous and Tumtum: Intersex and Jewish Law.......................... 72
	
Example 2—Tefillin (Phylacteries) of Rabbenu Tam and 
	
Tefillin on Hol HaMoed................................................................................... 76
	
Example 3—Praying the Morning Prayer (Shaharit) Late...................................... 82
(B)	
Inclusion of all Jews................................................................................... 85
	
Example 4—Calling One who is Blind or who Cannot Read to the Torah................ 85
	
Example 5—Reciting Birkat HaMazon for Those Who Cannot............................... 87
	
Example 6—Giving Food to One who Doesn’t Know the Blessing..........................89
(C)	
Jewish-Gentile Relations............................................................................. 91
	
Example 7—Carrying for a Gentile on Yom Tov................................................... 91
	
Example 8—Giving Mail to a Gentile before Shabbat........................................... 93
	
Example 9—Having a Gentile Buy Things for a Jew............................................. 95
(D)	
The Existence of Erroneous Customs..........................................................96


viii
Table of Contents
	
Example 10—Eruv and Public Domains.............................................................96
	
Example 11—Saying “Amen” After “Ga’al Israel”.................................................99
	
Example 12—Eating Hadash...........................................................................102
IX.	
Alternative Views of the Mishna Berura’s Methodology............................ 104
	
Simcha Fishbane’s Method and Meaning of the Mishna Berura.......................... 104
	
Benjamin Brown’s “Soft Stringency”.............................................................. 106
X.	
Conclusion................................................................................................113
Two Hundred Fifty Illustrative Examples from the Mishna Berura............115
Terminology ....................................................................................................  119
Juridical Strategy ............................................................................................ 144
Interpretative Strategy ....................................................................................185
The Accretive Technique   
	
In Addition to Juridical Strategy .................................................................... 238 
	
In Addition to Interpretative Strategy ............................................................. 272
Reliance on the Gra   
	
In Addition to Juridical Strategy .................................................................... 287 
	
In Addition to Interpretative Strategy ............................................................. 302  
The Role of Custom ......................................................................................... 319
	
Appendix A: A Summary Index of the Examples .................................... 357
	
Appendix B: A Brief Note on the History of Halakha .............................  368
	
Appendix C: Biography of Selected Rabbis Mentioned 
	
                           in Mishna Berura.................................................................371
	
Appendix D: A Brief Note in the Names of Jewish Books......................... 379
	
Index........................................................................................................ 382


I
General Methodology of 
Codification of Jewish Law
D
ue to its exilic development since the beginning of the Common 
Era, Jewish law1 lacks a clear method for resolving disputes. 
Talmudic, medieval, and contemporary debates linger, since direct, 
categorical rules of resolution, such as majority votes of the Supreme 
Court in the United States or Papal pronouncements in canon law, 
do not exist. The exact reason for this is beyond the scope of this 
introduction, yet some methodological explanation will allow the 
reader to have a better understanding of the relationship of the 
modern classical work of Jewish law, the Mishna Berura,2 to other 
jurisprudential approaches to obedience to Jewish law. 
Until about two thousand years ago, the Jewish community 
had a “supreme court” called the Sanhedrin,3 a (parliamentary) 
joint legislative and judicial assembly that resolved disputes in 
matters of Jewish law by majority vote.4 Following the destruction 
1	
For a brief note on the history of Halakha, see appendix B. 
2	
Though the Mishna Berura was written by Rabbi Israel Meir Kagan, and we 
provide a brief biography of the author, this article addresses the book and not 
the author. It is the methodology of the Mishna Berura as a book, not Rabbi 
Kagan as a jurist, that we seek to examine. See infra text accompanying notes 
52–97 (providing more information on Rabbi Kagan, as well as on the book the 
Mishna Berura). 
3	
From the Greek Synedrion, the Aramaic word is commonly thought to be a 
translation of the Hebrew term “members of the Great Assembly,” a body which 
derives its authority from a set of biblical verses in Exodus.
4	
Maimonides, Mishna Torah, Sefer Shoftim, Hilkhot Sanhedrin Vehaonashin 
Hamesurin Lahem (Laws of the Sanhedrin and the punishments they are authorized to administer) 1:1, 3.


of the Second Temple in Jerusalem around 70 CE, this body ceased 
having undisputed juridical authority. Despite its temporary reconstitution in Yavneh and subsequent locations, the Sanhedrin could 
no longer impose uniformity of practice. The Mishna (c. 200 CE) 
bears witness to this phenomenon and illustrates the devolution of 
the Court by recounting various conflicts among the Sages without 
attempting to resolve them. 
From the time of the disbanding of the Sanhedrin through the 
centuries following the redaction of the two Talmuds5 (c. 650–700 
CE), disputes as to what the Jewish law should be in any specific case 
were resolved by an informal, consensus-based voting process in 
which the ordained rabbis of the generation participated.6 Not every 
dispute, however, reached a resolution, and since there was no 
consensus on what the normative practice should be, the law was 
left open.7
From about the year 700 CE until the modern era the process 
for resolving disputes further deteriorated, to the point that even 
informal consensus was no longer possible. Moreover, diverse 
halakhic opinions began to proliferate. This combination had 
various reasons: for example, geography made communication 
across communities difficult, and increased interest in Talmud 
study in areas with very diverse living conditions led to different 
ways to understand the Talmudic texts as influenced by location. 
Regardless of the reason, however, disagreements on points of law 
became common, and methods of dispute resolution became highly 
analytical. Support for one opinion over another rested upon which 
opinion was seen to be more consistent with the accepted Talmudic 
sources. The opinion that was shown to be a more accurate 
5	
Indeed, though the Babylonian (c. 500 ce) and Palestinian (c. 350–400 ce) 
Talmuds are often in accord, the very notion of two Talmuds points to a decline 
in any ability to develop a unified consensus authority for Jewish law. 
6	
Thus, for example, the Talmud sometimes concludes a dispute with the word 
“vehilcheta,” which is generally understood to mean “and this is the proper 
practice,” denoting the consensus that is mentioned above.
7	
In some instances a consensus developed, but uncertainty has since arisen as to 
what that consensus ruling actually was.


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