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Running in Good Faith? Observant Judaism and Libertarian Politics

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Could a religiously observant Jew, in good conscience, run as a libertarian candidate, promoting a libertarian platform? Or, would doing so betray fundamental Jewish values? Running in Good Faith? Observant Judaism and Libertarian Politics considers the seemingly irreconcilable values and political commitments of Judaism and libertarianism. The latter prizes individualism, self-ownership, private property, and freedom, whereas the former emphasizes community, charity, and service of God. But are these differences so sharp? This book seeks to determine if this is an essential clash or merely an apparent one, and to stimulate a broad discussion of Judaism, values, politics, and political philosophy in order to call into question what people think they know, about both Judaism and libertarianism.
Krinsky, A. Running in Good Faith? Observant Judaism and Libertarian Politics : монография / A. Krinsky. - Boston : Academic Studies Press, 2020. - 255 с. - ISBN 978-1-64469-349-0. - Текст : электронный. - URL: https://znanium.ru/catalog/product/2239588 (дата обращения: 19.11.2026). – Режим доступа: по подписке.
Фрагмент текстового слоя документа размещен для индексирующих роботов
Running 
in Good 
Faith?
Observant 
Judaism and 
Libertarian 
Politics




Boston
Running 
in Good 
Faith?
Observant 
Judaism and 
Libertarian 
Politics
ALAN D. 
KRINSKY


Library of Congress Control Number: 2020944465
ISBN 9781644693476 (hardback) 
ISBN 9781644693483 (paperback)
ISBN 9781644693490 (adobe pdf)
ISBN 9781644693506 (ePub)
Copyright © 2020 Academic Studies Press
All rights reserved.
Book design by Lapiz Digital Services.
Cover design by Ivan Grave.
Artwork by Udi Merioz, reproduced by permission. 
Published by Cherry Orchard Books, an imprint of Academic Studies Press 
1577 Beacon Street
Brookline, MA 02446, USA
press@academicstudiespress.com 
www.academicstudiespress.com


Contents
Foreword by Rabbi Arye Klapper
vii
Preface
xi
Introduction: From Ayn Rand to Libertarianism
1
1.	 Freedom Versus Servitude 
15
2.	 Ownership Versus Stewardship: The Body
39
3.	 Ownership Versus Stewardship: Private Property 
66
4.	 Ownership Versus Stewardship: Taxation, Tzedakah, Charity 
98
5.	 Government Tyranny Versus Government Protection 
132
6.	 Individualism Versus Community 
151
Conclusion: While Standing on One Foot 
175
Epilogue
189
Endnotes
192
Bibliography 
215
Acknowledgements
224
Index 
229




Foreword
by Rabbi Aryeh Klapper
Judaism contains an astonishing number of laws—613 separate categories, each with tens, hundreds, or even thousands of sections and subsections. We are proud of the comprehensiveness of our legal system, 
or halakhah; a favorite Jewish story tells how the Khazar king was persuaded to convert by the fact that we have an extensive legal framework 
for restroom conduct. These people, he realized, were serious about 
applying religion to everything.
Libertarianism, by contrast, seeks to minimize law to the bare necessities. Every law is by definition an infringement of autonomy. At first 
glance, Judaism and libertarianism have radically opposed sensibilities.
But this opposition may be only seeming. Libertarianism sees 
human beings as free to impose any sort and number of obligations on 
themselves; the objection is only to imposing them on others. Moreover, 
some schools of libertarianism allow law to play a bigger role in smaller 
communities, where people have the realistic option of moving out, and 
where their individual voices play a much larger and more direct role in 
deciding what laws should be made. In other words, libertarian concerns 
apply to enforceable law, and especially to law that is enforced by the 
threat of official violence.


Foreword
viii
Much of halakhah is not law in that sense. Whole categories of 
Jewish law have no formal enforcement mechanism, and in fact are 
defined by the halakhic system to be outside the penal jurisdiction of 
human authorities. Moreover, the formal enforcement mechanisms of 
Jewish law are deliberately impractical and impracticable. For example, 
the only punishment listed for many violations is death, but halakhah 
claims capital jurisdiction only while the Sanhedrin [the highest court] is 
meeting in the Chamber of Hewn Stone in the Temple, and the Temple 
has been a ruin for two millennia, while halakhah endures. Regardless, 
R. Akiva and R. Tarfon stated soon after the Temple’s destruction that 
“Had we been on the Sanhedrin, no one would ever have been executed.”
For the two millennia immediately preceding 1948, Jews had very 
limited autonomy over themselves (and what authority they had was 
almost entirely local). Enforcement of Jewish law on the Jewish community was sometimes formally compelled by the non-Jewish authorities, 
and sometimes forbidden. Decisions about enforcement were always 
heavily influenced by what we might call the Jewish community’s “foreign policy” rather than by concerns for domestic tranquility or individual self-actualization. It is difficult to see those decisions as derived from 
or reflecting any general positions about political theory.
Jews also had no authority whatever over Gentiles, and the concept 
of a joint Jewish-Gentile polity guided by Judaism was almost inconceivable. So the internal enforcement practices of Jewish communities have 
no necessary implications for evaluating the political practices of Gentile 
or pluralistic communities. 
Given this fact, how ought Jews and Jewish communities to orient 
themselves in such places, particularly in the modern, secular state? Such 
is the question Alan Krinsky poses in this book.
Judaism does not understand its legal aspects as universally binding 
or applicable. Jewish law for Gentiles is formally much less expansive 
than that for Jews. The standard framing is that it includes only seven 
categories, known as the Seven Noahide Commandments, as opposed to 
the 613 categories for Jews. It is common and reasonable to think of the 
Noahide commandments as representing the bare necessities of governing relationships among human beings.
Within that framework, halakhah offers very little guidance as to 
how much government is necessary. For example, the commandment 


Foreword
ix
known as dinim requires the establishment of a viable criminal justice 
system. But for what crimes? Here is the powerful formulation of the 
great late nineteenth-century halakhist R. Meir Simchah of Dvinsk, in 
his Torah commentary Meshekh Chokhmah to Exodus 24:3:
Know that Noachides are commanded regarding dinim (Sanhedrin 56b), 
and the position of the medieval authorities is that this refers to laws that 
appeal to human reason, but to coerce and compel regarding the statutes 
and commitments of Torah is justified only on the ground that “All Jews 
are arevim/guarantors for each other” (Shavuot 39a and others), so that 
if one transgresses, one damages their friend and their entire community, 
and therefore a rabbinic court is justified in coercing and judging the 
transgressor of the commandments of Hashem the Blessed, as without 
this it would be inappropriate for one person sheyit’arev (to mix into) 
another person’s relationship with his Creator.
Meshekh Chokhmah’s formulation seems fully consistent with a libertarian credo for Gentile society. Only laws that command rational consent 
may be enforced. No human society has the right to compel any human 
being to submit to a notion of the good that is not universally demonstrable, unless disobeying the law poses a genuine substantive threat to the 
wellbeing of the society. Human societies have the option of mutual religious or moral responsibility, and therefore of enforcing the law beyond 
libertarian limits, only when they act on the basis of a universally (within 
that society) acknowledged set of values.
A pluralistic society by definition does not have a universally agreed 
set of values. Meshekh Chokhmah contends that it is wrong for any 
group, majority or minority, to enforce its own values on a pluralistic 
society. In his view—which is certainly not the only Jewish voice on the 
issue—Judaism mandates something like a libertarian political ethos in 
American politics. 
Certainly Judaism is not bound to any policy prescriptions advanced 
by a political party or movement. But it is fair and valuable to approach 
the question of what Judaism has to say about current policy issues with a 
recognition that Judaism may very well share crucial ideological ground 
with libertarians. Alan Krinsky does the Jewish and American publics a 
service by approaching such questions with that recognition. I hope his 
work finds broad readership and generates a great deal of productive and 
constructive discussion.




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