Running in Good Faith? Observant Judaism and Libertarian Politics
Покупка
Тематика:
Религии Древнего мира. История религий.
Издательство:
Academic Studies Press
Автор:
Krinsky Alan D.
Год издания: 2020
Кол-во страниц: 255
Дополнительно
Вид издания:
Монография
Уровень образования:
Дополнительное профессиональное образование
ISBN: 978-1-64469-349-0
Артикул: 872416.01.99
Could a religiously observant Jew, in good conscience, run as a libertarian candidate, promoting a libertarian platform? Or, would doing so betray fundamental Jewish values? Running in Good Faith? Observant Judaism and Libertarian Politics considers the seemingly irreconcilable values and political commitments of Judaism and libertarianism. The latter prizes individualism, self-ownership, private property, and freedom, whereas the former emphasizes community, charity, and service of God. But are these differences so sharp? This book seeks to determine if this is an essential clash or merely an apparent one, and to stimulate a broad discussion of Judaism, values, politics, and political philosophy in order to call into question what people think they know, about both Judaism and libertarianism.
Скопировать запись
Фрагмент текстового слоя документа размещен для индексирующих роботов
Running in Good Faith? Observant Judaism and Libertarian Politics
Boston Running in Good Faith? Observant Judaism and Libertarian Politics ALAN D. KRINSKY
Library of Congress Control Number: 2020944465 ISBN 9781644693476 (hardback) ISBN 9781644693483 (paperback) ISBN 9781644693490 (adobe pdf) ISBN 9781644693506 (ePub) Copyright © 2020 Academic Studies Press All rights reserved. Book design by Lapiz Digital Services. Cover design by Ivan Grave. Artwork by Udi Merioz, reproduced by permission. Published by Cherry Orchard Books, an imprint of Academic Studies Press 1577 Beacon Street Brookline, MA 02446, USA press@academicstudiespress.com www.academicstudiespress.com
Contents Foreword by Rabbi Arye Klapper vii Preface xi Introduction: From Ayn Rand to Libertarianism 1 1. Freedom Versus Servitude 15 2. Ownership Versus Stewardship: The Body 39 3. Ownership Versus Stewardship: Private Property 66 4. Ownership Versus Stewardship: Taxation, Tzedakah, Charity 98 5. Government Tyranny Versus Government Protection 132 6. Individualism Versus Community 151 Conclusion: While Standing on One Foot 175 Epilogue 189 Endnotes 192 Bibliography 215 Acknowledgements 224 Index 229
Foreword by Rabbi Aryeh Klapper Judaism contains an astonishing number of laws—613 separate categories, each with tens, hundreds, or even thousands of sections and subsections. We are proud of the comprehensiveness of our legal system, or halakhah; a favorite Jewish story tells how the Khazar king was persuaded to convert by the fact that we have an extensive legal framework for restroom conduct. These people, he realized, were serious about applying religion to everything. Libertarianism, by contrast, seeks to minimize law to the bare necessities. Every law is by definition an infringement of autonomy. At first glance, Judaism and libertarianism have radically opposed sensibilities. But this opposition may be only seeming. Libertarianism sees human beings as free to impose any sort and number of obligations on themselves; the objection is only to imposing them on others. Moreover, some schools of libertarianism allow law to play a bigger role in smaller communities, where people have the realistic option of moving out, and where their individual voices play a much larger and more direct role in deciding what laws should be made. In other words, libertarian concerns apply to enforceable law, and especially to law that is enforced by the threat of official violence.
Foreword viii Much of halakhah is not law in that sense. Whole categories of Jewish law have no formal enforcement mechanism, and in fact are defined by the halakhic system to be outside the penal jurisdiction of human authorities. Moreover, the formal enforcement mechanisms of Jewish law are deliberately impractical and impracticable. For example, the only punishment listed for many violations is death, but halakhah claims capital jurisdiction only while the Sanhedrin [the highest court] is meeting in the Chamber of Hewn Stone in the Temple, and the Temple has been a ruin for two millennia, while halakhah endures. Regardless, R. Akiva and R. Tarfon stated soon after the Temple’s destruction that “Had we been on the Sanhedrin, no one would ever have been executed.” For the two millennia immediately preceding 1948, Jews had very limited autonomy over themselves (and what authority they had was almost entirely local). Enforcement of Jewish law on the Jewish community was sometimes formally compelled by the non-Jewish authorities, and sometimes forbidden. Decisions about enforcement were always heavily influenced by what we might call the Jewish community’s “foreign policy” rather than by concerns for domestic tranquility or individual self-actualization. It is difficult to see those decisions as derived from or reflecting any general positions about political theory. Jews also had no authority whatever over Gentiles, and the concept of a joint Jewish-Gentile polity guided by Judaism was almost inconceivable. So the internal enforcement practices of Jewish communities have no necessary implications for evaluating the political practices of Gentile or pluralistic communities. Given this fact, how ought Jews and Jewish communities to orient themselves in such places, particularly in the modern, secular state? Such is the question Alan Krinsky poses in this book. Judaism does not understand its legal aspects as universally binding or applicable. Jewish law for Gentiles is formally much less expansive than that for Jews. The standard framing is that it includes only seven categories, known as the Seven Noahide Commandments, as opposed to the 613 categories for Jews. It is common and reasonable to think of the Noahide commandments as representing the bare necessities of governing relationships among human beings. Within that framework, halakhah offers very little guidance as to how much government is necessary. For example, the commandment
Foreword ix known as dinim requires the establishment of a viable criminal justice system. But for what crimes? Here is the powerful formulation of the great late nineteenth-century halakhist R. Meir Simchah of Dvinsk, in his Torah commentary Meshekh Chokhmah to Exodus 24:3: Know that Noachides are commanded regarding dinim (Sanhedrin 56b), and the position of the medieval authorities is that this refers to laws that appeal to human reason, but to coerce and compel regarding the statutes and commitments of Torah is justified only on the ground that “All Jews are arevim/guarantors for each other” (Shavuot 39a and others), so that if one transgresses, one damages their friend and their entire community, and therefore a rabbinic court is justified in coercing and judging the transgressor of the commandments of Hashem the Blessed, as without this it would be inappropriate for one person sheyit’arev (to mix into) another person’s relationship with his Creator. Meshekh Chokhmah’s formulation seems fully consistent with a libertarian credo for Gentile society. Only laws that command rational consent may be enforced. No human society has the right to compel any human being to submit to a notion of the good that is not universally demonstrable, unless disobeying the law poses a genuine substantive threat to the wellbeing of the society. Human societies have the option of mutual religious or moral responsibility, and therefore of enforcing the law beyond libertarian limits, only when they act on the basis of a universally (within that society) acknowledged set of values. A pluralistic society by definition does not have a universally agreed set of values. Meshekh Chokhmah contends that it is wrong for any group, majority or minority, to enforce its own values on a pluralistic society. In his view—which is certainly not the only Jewish voice on the issue—Judaism mandates something like a libertarian political ethos in American politics. Certainly Judaism is not bound to any policy prescriptions advanced by a political party or movement. But it is fair and valuable to approach the question of what Judaism has to say about current policy issues with a recognition that Judaism may very well share crucial ideological ground with libertarians. Alan Krinsky does the Jewish and American publics a service by approaching such questions with that recognition. I hope his work finds broad readership and generates a great deal of productive and constructive discussion.