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Palestine to Israel. Mandate to State, 1945-1948. Volume 2

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Seventy years after the creation of the State of Israel, Palestine to Israel: Mandate to State, 1945-1948 offers the definitive narrative of the achievement of Jewish sovereignty in the beleaguered Promised Land. Professor Monty Noam Penkower explores developments in Palestine and in the Arab states, including how the Palestine quagmire became a pawn in inter-Arab feuds; British and American responses both official and public; the role of Holocaust survivors; the context of the Cold War; and the saga as it unfolded in the corridors of the United Nations. Joining extensive archival research to a lucid prose, the two volumes offer a riveting conclusion to his Palestine in Turmoil and Decision on Palestine Deferred.
Penkower, M. Palestine to Israel. Mandate to State, 1945-1948. Volume 2 : монография / M. Penkower. - Boston : Academic Studies Press, 2019. - 471 с. - ISBN 978-1-61811-878-3. - Текст : электронный. - URL: https://znanium.ru/catalog/product/2239558 (дата обращения: 19.11.2026). – Режим доступа: по подписке.
Фрагмент текстового слоя документа размещен для индексирующих роботов
PALESTINE
TO ISRAEL
Mandate to State, 1945-1948


Touro University Press Books
Series Editors
Michael A. Shmidman, PhD (Touro College, New York)
Simcha Fishbane, PhD (Touro College, New York)


PALESTINE 
TO ISRAEL
Mandate to State, 1945-1948
Volume II: Into the International 
Arena, 1947-1948
Monty Noam Penkower
New York
2019


Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Penkower, Monty Noam, 1942- author.
Title: Palestine to Israel : mandate to state, 1945-1948 / Monty N. 
Penkower.
Description: New York, NY : Touro University Press, 2019. |
Series: Touro University Press books 
Identifiers: LCCN 2018023261 (print) | LCCN 2018032209 (ebook) | 
ISBN 9781618118752 (ebook) | ISBN 9781618118738 | 
ISBN 9781618118738 (volume 1 : hardcover) | ISBN 9781618118745 
(volume 1 : pbk.) | ISBN 9781618118769 (volume 2 : hardcover) | 
ISBN 9781618118776 (volume 2 : paperback)
Subjects: LCSH: Palestine—History—1929-1948. | 
Israel—History—1948-1967.
Classification: LCC DS126.4 (ebook) | LCC DS126.4 .P435 2018 
(print) | DDC 956.94/04—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018023261
ISBN (hardback) 9781618118738 (vol. I) 
ISBN (hardback) 9781618118769 (vol. II)
ISBN (paperback) 9781618118745 (vol. I)
ISBN (paperback) 9781618118776 (vol. II)
ISBN (electronic) 9781618118752 
Book design by Kryon Publishing Services (P) Ltd. 
www.kryonpublishing.com 
Cover design by Ivan Grave
©Touro University Press, 2019
Published by Touro University Press and Academic Studies Press.
Typeset, printed and distributed by Academic Studies Press.
Touro University Press
Michael A. Shmidman and Simcha Fishbane, Editors
320 West 31st Street, Fourth Floor,
New York, NY 10001, USA
touropress.admin@touro.edu
Academic Studies Press
28 Montfern Avenue
Brighton, MA 02135, USA
press@academicstudiespress.com
www.academicstudiespress.com


To the Cherished Memory of
Yael Goodman Penkower (1945–2016)
“Most blessed of women be Yael” (Judges 5:24)


Table of Contents
Volume I: Rebellion Launched, 1945–1946
Preface
vii
1. The 100,000
1
2. Tenuat HaMeri HaIvri
72
3. The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry
141
4. “Black Sabbath” to the Hotel Royal Monceau
210
5. Truman, Bevin, and the World Zionist Congress
275
Volume II: Into the International Arena, 1947–1948
6. To the United Nations
341
7. UNSCOP, Two Sergeants, and the Exodus 1947
405
8. Partition
472
9. Civil War
546
10. Statehood at Long Last
619
Conclusion
696
Bibliography
741
Appendix
772
Index
773


The continuing deterioration of law and order in Palestine found 
the Colonial Civil and War Offices at loggerheads in the Defence 
Committee’s meeting on New Year’s Day 1947. Creech Jones cautioned 
that the adoption of more aggressive tactics against terrorism would 
upset the political balance, weaken the Jewish moderates, and make 
achieving a settlement more difficult. Montgomery, echoing Secretary 
of State for War A. V. Alexander, charged per contra that the country was 
“in the grip of lawlessness,” and he called for mobile columns of troops 
to deal swiftly with outrages. The retention of Palestine was strategically 
essential to HMG’s position in the Middle East, Bevin argued, a region 
without whose oil and other resources the British domestic standard of 
living they were aiming for could not be achieved. Moreover, he stressed, 
the government had to realize that any solution it was going to impose 
would be met with opposition from both Jews and Arabs. “To continue 
the present policy placed the Armed Forces in an impossible position,” 
Attlee concluded. Alexander received a green light to prepare a revised 
directive, working in conjunction with Creech Jones and Cunningham, 
for submission to the committee and the Cabinet. Montgomery’s draft 
two days later authorized the High Commissioner to take “all possible 
steps” by the police and the military against law breakers “to ensure that 
the initiative lies with the forces of the Crown.”1
In Bevin’s view, Great Britain’s great economic difficulties necessitated a Palestine policy that favored the Arabs. Three weeks earlier, 
he and the Chiefs of Staff Committee had both advised Attlee that the 
84,000 troops in Egypt had to be completely evacuated by September 
1949, with General Headquarters moved to the Canal Zone as soon as 
possible. “Nothing to bargain with—no credits, coal or goods,” his memorandum to the Cabinet read on January 1, and Anglo-American negotiations were pending as to British sterling balances. The Mediterranean 


problem would have been easier, he asserted, if HMG had claimed 
Cyrenaica by conquest “and let Egypt and Palestine go.” One hope lay in 
the protection by recent postwar treaties regarding Jewish property in 
Rumania and Hungary, which he thought would help the Palestine problem. Most important, he and Minister of Fuel and Power Shinwell advised 
the Cabinet in a joint paper on the 7th, the Middle East was likely to provide “a greater proportion of the total world increase of production than 
any other oil-producing region,” Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Iraq 
becoming the world’s major oil producers by 1950. Offending the Arabs, 
they emphasized, “by appearing to encourage Jewish settlement and to 
endorse the Jewish aspiration for a separate State,” would entail grave 
risks. An analysis signed by Beeley on January 2 for Attlee, advocating a 
unitary state in Palestine as called for in the Arab plan, reflected Bevin’s 
preference. Yet the Foreign Secretary also had to satisfy the primary concern of the Chiefs of Staff: might the Mandate be surrendered and at the 
same time allow for safeguarding Britain’s strategic needs in Palestine and 
wider interests in the region? Any Palestine solution, the Joint Planning 
Staffs’ memorandum of the 5th stated, “must ensure the retention of the 
goodwill of the Arab world.”2
Cunningham had no desire to hand over matters to the military, he 
told Fishman just before leaving for consultations in London, but he 
worried what might happen if the terrorist outbreaks continued. (To 
Creech Jones, he described Zionism as a movement where “the forces of 
nationalism are accompanied by the psychology of the Jew, which it is 
important to recognize as something quite abnormal and unresponsive 
to rational treatment.”) At a conference in the Colonial Office on the 
3rd, he dissented from Montgomery’s offer of the “whole strength of 
the British Army” if necessary to mount thorough searches throughout Palestine, “turning the place upside down,” without waiting for 
evidence. The Army had not been unduly restricted there, he claimed, 
and general searches would merely disturb innocent people and mean 
“a general conflagration.” It would probably lead to the evacuation of 
British women and children, as well as warfare throughout the country, thus destroying the hope of a political settlement. He agreed to 
Montgomery’s draft that “all possible steps” would be taken to establish 
and maintain law and order, but he was not prepared to give the military commander in Palestine a free hand, since as High Commissioner 
he had to “take into account the political aspect.” The decision as to how 


the revised directive would most effectively be carried out now rested 
with the Cabinet.3
Backing Cunningham, Creech Jones pointed out that there had 
recently been a stiffening of the yishuv moderates and the growth of 
a hatred of terrorism. In the Colonial Secretary’s interview with BenGurion the previous day, the newly reelected Agency Executive chairman had denounced terrorism and so had the recent World Zionist 
Congress in Basle. Explaining to Creech Jones that Weizmann had been 
defeated at the Congress because of his “blind trust” in Britain, BenGurion had asked for free immigration to Palestine and cultivation of 
the soil, together with the yishuv’s right to shape its own life as freely as 
any other free people. He proposed that so long as no change occurred 
in British policy, informal talks with the Agency could be held instead of 
attendance at the resumed London Conference. The Executive was not 
bound to any formula, not even to the idea of a Jewish commonwealth. 
The Congress had ruled out a trusteeship, Ben-Gurion explained, and 
if HMG could not be bound by the Mandate in ruling Palestine, then 
“there must be a Jewish State.” Martin, present along with Gater, noted 
that Ben-Gurion’s attitude throughout was one of “marked cordiality.” 
The Zionist leader had referred several times to the natural sympathy 
between the Jews and the British people, and expressed his belief that, 
if only the British government would trust the Jews, there would be a 
growth of confidence on both sides and hope of a settlement.4
The Foreign Secretary’s initial suggestions for a long-term policy 
surfaced when meeting Cunningham the next day, Creech Jones also 
in attendance. Hearing the High Commissioner explain his differences with Montgomery and his claim that only a definitive political settlement would finally end terrorism, Bevin suggested that 
provincial autonomy should be carried out as an interim arrangement designed to lead to partition within a reasonably short period. 
The Jewish and Arab provinces, each responsible for law and order 
in their specific area, would have a right to “secede” after some such 
period as five years. HMG would have difficulty at the UN in proposing immediate partition, he explained, but if the conclusion were 
reached that it should be put into effect immediately, London should 
try to induce Washington to make the proposal in the first instance. 
Discussion which followed of steps to make partition more palatable to 
certain of the Arab states included the port of Aqaba to be ceded to Ibn 


Saud; Abdullah relinquishing some of south Jordan to the Wahhabi 
monarch in return for getting parts of Palestine; and the cession to 
Syria of the northeastern corner of Palestine including the Huleh Basin, 
with the Jews being compensated for the loss of the Huleh by incorporating in their area parts of western Galilee. Hearing that Ben-Gurion 
and Executive colleagues were prepared to enter unconditionally into 
exploratory talks, Bevin declared that it was essential to open discussions with the Jews. He thought it of no consequence if this took place 
within the framework of the conference or on some other footing, and 
asked Creech Jones to make sure that the Jewish Agency delegation 
would be available in London at the time of the conference.5
In Palestine, British all-day curfews in Tel Aviv and Rehovot on 
January 1–2 and the screening there of more than 4,000 men did nothing to check the storm clouds gathering again across that troubled landscape. Concerted attacks by the Irgun and the Stern Group took place 
against military installations in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Haifa, Tiberias, 
and Hadera. One British officer and a Jewish constable were killed, and 
many people wounded. A police mobile truck and a troop-carrier were 
blown up by road-mines. Another whole-day search in Tel Aviv screened 
3,000 people; 62 were detained. Gurney warned Fishman and Ben-Zvi 
that he could not hold back the Army for long, and asked Myerson and 
Remez on the 7th for a halt to “refugee ships.” The yishuv understood 
that terror damaged its cause from a political and moral point of view, 
she responded, but the emotion of a “Jewish heart” after the dispatch 
of a boat of refugees was greater than political instinct. Those in the DP 
camps could not wait; their arrival posed no danger to any Palestinian 
Arab, but for the Jew “this is a question of life.” Time worked in the 
Arabs’ favor, Myerson added, whereas we lacked power to insure that 
in a short time there would truly be a good solution. Gurney repeated 
that he understood the Jewish needs and views, but their demands were 
beyond his powers.6
As for the death sentence passed on January 1 by the Jerusalem 
Military Court on Dov Gruner, a former lance corporal in the British 
Army’s Italian campaign who had been badly wounded while taking part 
in the Irgun attack on the Ramat Gan police station in April 1946, the 
final word rested with G. O. C. Barker. The accused had refused to recognize the court’s authority, and only made a brief statement, concluding 
thus: “There is no force in the world that can break the link between the 


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