Palestine to Israel. Mandate to State, 1945-1948. Volume 2
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Тематика:
Внешняя политика зарубежных государств
Издательство:
Academic Studies Press
Автор:
Penkower Monty Noam
Год издания: 2019
Кол-во страниц: 471
Дополнительно
Вид издания:
Монография
Уровень образования:
Дополнительное профессиональное образование
ISBN: 978-1-61811-878-3
Артикул: 872386.01.99
Seventy years after the creation of the State of Israel, Palestine to Israel: Mandate to State, 1945-1948 offers the definitive narrative of the achievement of Jewish sovereignty in the beleaguered Promised Land. Professor Monty Noam Penkower explores developments in Palestine and in the Arab states, including how the Palestine quagmire became a pawn in inter-Arab feuds; British and American responses both official and public; the role of Holocaust survivors; the context of the Cold War; and the saga as it unfolded in the corridors of the United Nations. Joining extensive archival research to a lucid prose, the two volumes offer a riveting conclusion to his Palestine in Turmoil and Decision on Palestine Deferred.
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УДК:
ОКСО:
- ВО - Бакалавриат
- 41.03.04: Политология
- 41.03.05: Международные отношения
- 46.03.01: История
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PALESTINE TO ISRAEL Mandate to State, 1945-1948
Touro University Press Books Series Editors Michael A. Shmidman, PhD (Touro College, New York) Simcha Fishbane, PhD (Touro College, New York)
PALESTINE TO ISRAEL Mandate to State, 1945-1948 Volume II: Into the International Arena, 1947-1948 Monty Noam Penkower New York 2019
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Penkower, Monty Noam, 1942- author. Title: Palestine to Israel : mandate to state, 1945-1948 / Monty N. Penkower. Description: New York, NY : Touro University Press, 2019. | Series: Touro University Press books Identifiers: LCCN 2018023261 (print) | LCCN 2018032209 (ebook) | ISBN 9781618118752 (ebook) | ISBN 9781618118738 | ISBN 9781618118738 (volume 1 : hardcover) | ISBN 9781618118745 (volume 1 : pbk.) | ISBN 9781618118769 (volume 2 : hardcover) | ISBN 9781618118776 (volume 2 : paperback) Subjects: LCSH: Palestine—History—1929-1948. | Israel—History—1948-1967. Classification: LCC DS126.4 (ebook) | LCC DS126.4 .P435 2018 (print) | DDC 956.94/04—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018023261 ISBN (hardback) 9781618118738 (vol. I) ISBN (hardback) 9781618118769 (vol. II) ISBN (paperback) 9781618118745 (vol. I) ISBN (paperback) 9781618118776 (vol. II) ISBN (electronic) 9781618118752 Book design by Kryon Publishing Services (P) Ltd. www.kryonpublishing.com Cover design by Ivan Grave ©Touro University Press, 2019 Published by Touro University Press and Academic Studies Press. Typeset, printed and distributed by Academic Studies Press. Touro University Press Michael A. Shmidman and Simcha Fishbane, Editors 320 West 31st Street, Fourth Floor, New York, NY 10001, USA touropress.admin@touro.edu Academic Studies Press 28 Montfern Avenue Brighton, MA 02135, USA press@academicstudiespress.com www.academicstudiespress.com
To the Cherished Memory of Yael Goodman Penkower (1945–2016) “Most blessed of women be Yael” (Judges 5:24)
Table of Contents Volume I: Rebellion Launched, 1945–1946 Preface vii 1. The 100,000 1 2. Tenuat HaMeri HaIvri 72 3. The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry 141 4. “Black Sabbath” to the Hotel Royal Monceau 210 5. Truman, Bevin, and the World Zionist Congress 275 Volume II: Into the International Arena, 1947–1948 6. To the United Nations 341 7. UNSCOP, Two Sergeants, and the Exodus 1947 405 8. Partition 472 9. Civil War 546 10. Statehood at Long Last 619 Conclusion 696 Bibliography 741 Appendix 772 Index 773
The continuing deterioration of law and order in Palestine found the Colonial Civil and War Offices at loggerheads in the Defence Committee’s meeting on New Year’s Day 1947. Creech Jones cautioned that the adoption of more aggressive tactics against terrorism would upset the political balance, weaken the Jewish moderates, and make achieving a settlement more difficult. Montgomery, echoing Secretary of State for War A. V. Alexander, charged per contra that the country was “in the grip of lawlessness,” and he called for mobile columns of troops to deal swiftly with outrages. The retention of Palestine was strategically essential to HMG’s position in the Middle East, Bevin argued, a region without whose oil and other resources the British domestic standard of living they were aiming for could not be achieved. Moreover, he stressed, the government had to realize that any solution it was going to impose would be met with opposition from both Jews and Arabs. “To continue the present policy placed the Armed Forces in an impossible position,” Attlee concluded. Alexander received a green light to prepare a revised directive, working in conjunction with Creech Jones and Cunningham, for submission to the committee and the Cabinet. Montgomery’s draft two days later authorized the High Commissioner to take “all possible steps” by the police and the military against law breakers “to ensure that the initiative lies with the forces of the Crown.”1 In Bevin’s view, Great Britain’s great economic difficulties necessitated a Palestine policy that favored the Arabs. Three weeks earlier, he and the Chiefs of Staff Committee had both advised Attlee that the 84,000 troops in Egypt had to be completely evacuated by September 1949, with General Headquarters moved to the Canal Zone as soon as possible. “Nothing to bargain with—no credits, coal or goods,” his memorandum to the Cabinet read on January 1, and Anglo-American negotiations were pending as to British sterling balances. The Mediterranean
problem would have been easier, he asserted, if HMG had claimed Cyrenaica by conquest “and let Egypt and Palestine go.” One hope lay in the protection by recent postwar treaties regarding Jewish property in Rumania and Hungary, which he thought would help the Palestine problem. Most important, he and Minister of Fuel and Power Shinwell advised the Cabinet in a joint paper on the 7th, the Middle East was likely to provide “a greater proportion of the total world increase of production than any other oil-producing region,” Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Iraq becoming the world’s major oil producers by 1950. Offending the Arabs, they emphasized, “by appearing to encourage Jewish settlement and to endorse the Jewish aspiration for a separate State,” would entail grave risks. An analysis signed by Beeley on January 2 for Attlee, advocating a unitary state in Palestine as called for in the Arab plan, reflected Bevin’s preference. Yet the Foreign Secretary also had to satisfy the primary concern of the Chiefs of Staff: might the Mandate be surrendered and at the same time allow for safeguarding Britain’s strategic needs in Palestine and wider interests in the region? Any Palestine solution, the Joint Planning Staffs’ memorandum of the 5th stated, “must ensure the retention of the goodwill of the Arab world.”2 Cunningham had no desire to hand over matters to the military, he told Fishman just before leaving for consultations in London, but he worried what might happen if the terrorist outbreaks continued. (To Creech Jones, he described Zionism as a movement where “the forces of nationalism are accompanied by the psychology of the Jew, which it is important to recognize as something quite abnormal and unresponsive to rational treatment.”) At a conference in the Colonial Office on the 3rd, he dissented from Montgomery’s offer of the “whole strength of the British Army” if necessary to mount thorough searches throughout Palestine, “turning the place upside down,” without waiting for evidence. The Army had not been unduly restricted there, he claimed, and general searches would merely disturb innocent people and mean “a general conflagration.” It would probably lead to the evacuation of British women and children, as well as warfare throughout the country, thus destroying the hope of a political settlement. He agreed to Montgomery’s draft that “all possible steps” would be taken to establish and maintain law and order, but he was not prepared to give the military commander in Palestine a free hand, since as High Commissioner he had to “take into account the political aspect.” The decision as to how
the revised directive would most effectively be carried out now rested with the Cabinet.3 Backing Cunningham, Creech Jones pointed out that there had recently been a stiffening of the yishuv moderates and the growth of a hatred of terrorism. In the Colonial Secretary’s interview with BenGurion the previous day, the newly reelected Agency Executive chairman had denounced terrorism and so had the recent World Zionist Congress in Basle. Explaining to Creech Jones that Weizmann had been defeated at the Congress because of his “blind trust” in Britain, BenGurion had asked for free immigration to Palestine and cultivation of the soil, together with the yishuv’s right to shape its own life as freely as any other free people. He proposed that so long as no change occurred in British policy, informal talks with the Agency could be held instead of attendance at the resumed London Conference. The Executive was not bound to any formula, not even to the idea of a Jewish commonwealth. The Congress had ruled out a trusteeship, Ben-Gurion explained, and if HMG could not be bound by the Mandate in ruling Palestine, then “there must be a Jewish State.” Martin, present along with Gater, noted that Ben-Gurion’s attitude throughout was one of “marked cordiality.” The Zionist leader had referred several times to the natural sympathy between the Jews and the British people, and expressed his belief that, if only the British government would trust the Jews, there would be a growth of confidence on both sides and hope of a settlement.4 The Foreign Secretary’s initial suggestions for a long-term policy surfaced when meeting Cunningham the next day, Creech Jones also in attendance. Hearing the High Commissioner explain his differences with Montgomery and his claim that only a definitive political settlement would finally end terrorism, Bevin suggested that provincial autonomy should be carried out as an interim arrangement designed to lead to partition within a reasonably short period. The Jewish and Arab provinces, each responsible for law and order in their specific area, would have a right to “secede” after some such period as five years. HMG would have difficulty at the UN in proposing immediate partition, he explained, but if the conclusion were reached that it should be put into effect immediately, London should try to induce Washington to make the proposal in the first instance. Discussion which followed of steps to make partition more palatable to certain of the Arab states included the port of Aqaba to be ceded to Ibn
Saud; Abdullah relinquishing some of south Jordan to the Wahhabi monarch in return for getting parts of Palestine; and the cession to Syria of the northeastern corner of Palestine including the Huleh Basin, with the Jews being compensated for the loss of the Huleh by incorporating in their area parts of western Galilee. Hearing that Ben-Gurion and Executive colleagues were prepared to enter unconditionally into exploratory talks, Bevin declared that it was essential to open discussions with the Jews. He thought it of no consequence if this took place within the framework of the conference or on some other footing, and asked Creech Jones to make sure that the Jewish Agency delegation would be available in London at the time of the conference.5 In Palestine, British all-day curfews in Tel Aviv and Rehovot on January 1–2 and the screening there of more than 4,000 men did nothing to check the storm clouds gathering again across that troubled landscape. Concerted attacks by the Irgun and the Stern Group took place against military installations in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Haifa, Tiberias, and Hadera. One British officer and a Jewish constable were killed, and many people wounded. A police mobile truck and a troop-carrier were blown up by road-mines. Another whole-day search in Tel Aviv screened 3,000 people; 62 were detained. Gurney warned Fishman and Ben-Zvi that he could not hold back the Army for long, and asked Myerson and Remez on the 7th for a halt to “refugee ships.” The yishuv understood that terror damaged its cause from a political and moral point of view, she responded, but the emotion of a “Jewish heart” after the dispatch of a boat of refugees was greater than political instinct. Those in the DP camps could not wait; their arrival posed no danger to any Palestinian Arab, but for the Jew “this is a question of life.” Time worked in the Arabs’ favor, Myerson added, whereas we lacked power to insure that in a short time there would truly be a good solution. Gurney repeated that he understood the Jewish needs and views, but their demands were beyond his powers.6 As for the death sentence passed on January 1 by the Jerusalem Military Court on Dov Gruner, a former lance corporal in the British Army’s Italian campaign who had been badly wounded while taking part in the Irgun attack on the Ramat Gan police station in April 1946, the final word rested with G. O. C. Barker. The accused had refused to recognize the court’s authority, and only made a brief statement, concluding thus: “There is no force in the world that can break the link between the