On the Genesis of Thought and Language
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Издательство:
Academic Studies Press
Автор:
Koshelev Alexey
Год издания: 2020
Кол-во страниц: 236
Дополнительно
Вид издания:
Монография
Уровень образования:
Дополнительное профессиональное образование
ISBN: 978-1-64469-315-5
Артикул: 872305.01.99
In On the Genesis of Thought and Language, linguist Alexey Koshelev explores fundamental questions of how human concepts arise in a child, why concepts appear in a child before words, the genesis of language, and why there are so many languages. Chapter One introduces the fundamental dichotomy "visual (exogenous) vs. functional (endogenous)” cognitive units; these units are used to give non-verbal definitions of mental representations of various objects, actions, and situations. In particular, definitions of such concepts as GLASS, CHAIR, BANANA, TREE, LAKE, RUN, and some others are given. Chapter Two discusses how children form concepts, hierarchical relationships, and propositions (conceptual ‘utterances’). It is shown that the initial units of the child’s representation of the world are pre-conceptual cognitive units — mental representations of whole situations. In the course of two consecutive cycles in the child’s cognitive development, these units transform into (a) primary notions — object and motor concepts, and (b) binary role relationships. Together, they constitute the elementary language of thought which, in the process of thinking, is used to build conceptual structures — propositions. It is further demonstrated that, immediately after the formation of thought, the child begins to develop his native language in which concrete and motor concepts become initial meanings of nouns and verbs, while propositions become the meanings of the child’s expressions. The chapter concludes with a contrastive analysis of the proposed approach and Aristotle’s and Chomsky’s views on thought and language. Chapter Three analyzes how a community’s culture affects its language. It is demonstrated that the progress of a community, the main constituent of the civilizational component of its culture, enhances the development of the content component of language by extending the range of its lexical and grammatical meanings. In the context of this analysis, Daniel Everett’s (2008) hypothesis that culture affects language structure is discussed. In the subsequent sections, models of the development of human and social activity are offered. These models comprise three components: Activity (main component), Thought, and Language (auxiliary components that ensure the successful realization of activities). The models are illustrated with examples of some concrete societies.
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- ВО - Бакалавриат
- 45.03.01: Филология
- ВО - Магистратура
- 45.04.01: Филология
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On the Genesis of Thought and Language
Moscow & Boston ALEXEY KOSHELEV Translated by Alexander Kravchenko in collaboration with Jillian Smith ON THE GENESIS OF THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE On the Emergence of Concepts and Propositions The Nature and Structure of Human Categories On the Impact of Culture on Thought and Language
Library of Congress Control Number: 2020930749 Copyright © 2020 LRC Publishing House Copyright © 2020 А. D. Koshelev Copyright © 2020 A. V. Kravchenko & А. D. Koshelev, translation into English. Cover design by Sergey Zhigalkin. On the cover Reversible Head with Basket of Fruit, oil on panel by Giuseppe Arcimboldo. All rights reserved ISBN 978-1-64469-314-8 (hardback) ISBN 978-1-64469-315-5 (electronic) Typeset by LRC Publishing House Russia, Moscow, Bolshaya Lubyanka, 13/16 http://www.lrc-press.ru/?lang=en Published by Academic Studies Press in 2020 1577 Beacon Street, Brookline, MA, USA press@academicstudiespress.com www.academicstudiespress.com
Contents In lieu of a foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1. Illustrative examples of the problems addressed in this book . . . . . . . . . 1 1.1. Categories and lexical meanings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.2. Objects and their parts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Main topics discussed in this book. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Acknowledgements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Chapter 1 The evolutionary-synthetic approach and its concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1.1. Cognitive units: the perceptual vs. functional dichotomy . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1.2. General development theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 1.2.1. Development cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 1.2.2. Complete schema of development cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 1.2.3. Partial diff erentiation stage: the main and supplementary parts of objects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 1.2.4. Complete diff erentiation stage: role relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 1.2.5. Partial and complete integration stages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 1.2.6. “Flower” schema of a partitive system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 1.3. A basic-level concept and its development into a hierarchical system of parts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 1.3.1. Defi ning basic-level concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 1.3.2. Extended defi nition of a basic concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 1.3.3. Artifactual and natural basic concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 1.3.4. Notional words and their basic meanings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 1.3.5. Concepts and their parts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 1.3.6. Development of concepts into systems of parts . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 1.3.7. Flower schemas of partitive systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 1.3.8. Diff erentiation of adjoining objects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 1.3.9. The partitive system of an object as a pathway of knowledge . . . 34 1.4. Structural unity of phenomenal objects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 1.4.1. Role system of situation participants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 1.4.2. Role system of object properties (adjectival system) . . . . . . . . . 36
vi Contents 1.4.3. Full lexical meaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 1.4.4. Phenomena learning schemas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 1.4.5. Main factor in the development of mental representations . . . . . 40 1.4.6. Reference relation (Frege and Chomsky) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 1.4.7. The language of thought and its embodiment in diff erent languages. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 1.4.7.1. Linguistic embodiment of the units of the language of thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 1.4.7.2. Linguistic expression of partitive relationships . . . . . . . 46 1.5. The nature and structure of human categories. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 1.5.1. Defi nition of dual category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 1.5.2. “Age” structure of human categories. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 1.5.3. Basic meanings of the words tree and banana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 1.5.4. Distinction between semantic and pragmatic components in lexical meaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 1.5.5. Model of a fruit tree. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 Chapter 2 The genesis of human concepts and propositions. The initial stage of language. Aristotle and Chomsky on thought and language . . . . . . . . . . 64 2.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 2.1.1. The history of the problem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 2.1.2. The proposed solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 2.2. Mental representations of agentive situations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 2.2.1. The notion of situation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 2.2.2. Situation development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 2.2.3. The situation ‘PERSON IS RUNNING’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 2.2.4. Identifi cation of locomotive situations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 2.2.5. Specifi c situations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 2.2.6. Defi ning the term ‘situation’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 2.3. The development of basic situations into systems of protoconcepts . . . 77 2.3.1. Experimental data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 2.3.2. Decomposition of situations into Talmy’s components. . . . . . . . 79 2.3.3. Defi nition of protoconcepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 2.3.4. Defi nition of role relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 2.3.5. Integration of protoconcepts into protosituations . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 2.3.6. The level of protoconcepts in the situation tree. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 2.3.7. Identifi cation of situations of running . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 2.3.8. Specifi c protoconcepts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 2.3.9. Clarifying the identifi cation process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Contents vii 2.3.10. Situations of observable actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 2.3.11. Hundreds of thousands of protoconcepts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 2.3.12. Thousands of situations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 2.4. The development of protoconcepts into systems of object and motor concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 2.4.1. Experimental data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 2.4.2. The formation of object concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 2.4.3. The formation of a motor concept (action) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 2.4.4. The formation of a predicative relationship. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 2.4.5. The stage of conceptual integration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 2.4.6. The conceptual level of a development tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 2.4.7. Specifi c concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 2.4.8. Clarifying the identifi cation process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 2.4.9. The formation of conceptual situations of actions. . . . . . . . . . . 107 2.4.10. The outcome of the third cycle in the child’s development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 2.5. Matrices of concepts, propositions, and language. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 2.5.1. Conceptual classifi cation of the visible world. Conceptual matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 2.5.2. Propositional classifi cation of the visible world. Propositional matrix. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 2.5.3. The conceptual language of thought. Thought procedure . . . . . 116 2.5.4. The linguistic matrix as an initial stage of the child’s language. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 2.5.5. Distinguishing between general-cognitive and language-specifi c processes. Initial stages in language evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 2.5.6. Quick growth of the child’s lexicon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 2.6. Aristotle and Chomsky on thought and language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 2.6.1. Aristotle’s approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 2.6.2. Chomsky’s approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 2.6.3. On the purpose of language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 2.6.4. Why are there languages, and so many of them? . . . . . . . . . . . 135 2.7. Appendix. Does a child’s language aff ect his formation of concepts? (supplement to subsection 2.3.6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 2.8. Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140 2.8.1. On the indecomposability of concepts into elementary concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140 2.8.2. Leaps in the child’s cognitive development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 2.8.3. Spatial actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
viii Contents Chapter 3 The eff ect of culture on language: The case of the Amazonian tribe Pirahã . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 3.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 3.1.1. On the Pirahã language: does culture aff ect language? . . . . . . . 146 3.1.2. Sapir and Baudouin de Courtenay on the eff ect of culture on language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147 3.2. Models of activity development for individuals and ethnic groups . . . 150 3.2.1. The uniform progress of an ethnic group. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150 3.2.2. The Pirahã tribe and pottery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 3.2.3. Activities: crossing the Rubicon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154 3.2.4. The minimal model of human activity development. . . . . . . . . 154 3.2.5. The model of human activity development: basic concepts . . . 156 3.2.6. Case example: medical activity and its eff ects on the language and thought of a ethnogroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 3.2.7. Case-study: stages in the development of Al-Sayyid Bedouin Sign Language, ABSL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 3.2.8. The fi nal stage of human civilization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 3.2.9. Homo perfectus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 3.3. Systematization of mental representations and conceptualization of linguistic meanings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172 3.3.1. Two principles of development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 3.3.2. The child’s conceptualization of color and other properties . . . 176 3.3.3. Does a child’s language aff ect the process of diff erentiation?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178 3.3.4. Words for color in Pirahã: the role of color in the life of modern industrial societies and the Pirahã Indians . . . . . . . . 178 3.3.5. Lexical indicators of time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181 3.3.6. Counting and count words. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183 3.3.7. Absence of the passive voice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 3.3.8. On the universality of human concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188 3.3.9. Concluding remarks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190 3.4. On the relative nature of ‘exotic’ linguistic properties . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 3.4.1. Two principles of perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 3.4.2. ‘Exotic linguistic property’ as a relative feature . . . . . . . . . . . . 196 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197 Name index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214 Subject index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219 Lexical index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
In lieu of a foreword 1. Illustrative examples of the problems addressed in this book A well-known educator was once recalling an episode from his childhood when, for a long time, he had been trying without success to solve a complex math problem. An unexpected visitor—a friend of his father’s and a famous mathematician—saw the boy’s predicament and decided to help him. He did not try to solve the problem, however. Instead, he and the boy discussed in detail a specifi c simple case of the problem. After that, the educator recalls, he suddenly understood how to solve the problem generally. I will try to follow the example of that mathematician. There are quite a few theoretical constructions in this book (see section 2). Some of them, such as the notion of category, the nature of lexical meaning, and the distinction between objects and their parts, can be illustrated by simple obvious examples. They are given below along with brief discussions. I believe that, for the reader, thinking over and solving these problems independently will be a quick introduction to the issues discussed in this book. 1.1. Categories and lexical meanings The category “Games.” In the Aristotelian tradition a category was defi ned as a class of objects in which each member had some objective characteristic feature that distinguished it from the members of other categories. More than fi fty years ago, Ludwig Wittgenstein off ered a critique of such an understanding of a category. He introduced the notion of “family resemblances” to defi ne the category “Games” as he considered it to be non-classical, not having a unifi ed description or clear boundaries. Analyzing the diversity of human games and their features, he wrote: “Don’t say: “There must be something common, or they would not be called ‘games’” —but look and see whether there is anything common to all” ( Wittgenstein 1953: section 66). Furthermore, comparing diff erent games, he demonstrated that they resemble one another in a variety of features, like relatives do in a large family.
In lieu of a foreword In other words, he argued that games show “family resemblance” rather than possess a uniform characteristic feature. Wittgenstein’s approach has played a crucial role in working out an alternative defi nition of category as a fuzzy class of objects that resemble some standard / reference, or prototypical, object from the class. I do not share this position of Wittgenstein. I believe that the category “Games” does possess a uniform characteristic that distinguishes games from other activities. However, this is not an observable, or exogenous, characteristic like that Wittgenstein was looking for (there really isn’t such), but an endogenous, or functional, characteristic that is not accessible to external perception. We identify the members of one family not by their appearance or “family resemblance” (not relatives can be more similar than relatives) but by endogenous (functional) characterization—the presence of kinship between them. As will be shown in the book, it is the endogenous (functional) characteristic that underlies the human concept of category. It is also important that this endogenous characteristic belongs to the basic meaning of the word. Because of this, the word game may be used correctly to refer to any game while it cannot be used correctly to refer to a non-game activity. PROBLEM 1. Identify the characteristic feature of the category “Games” which strictly separates games from other, similar kinds of activity. DISCUSSION. Evidence for the existence of such a feature is provided by the examples of incorrect uses of the word game to refer to some combat sports that appear at fi rst sight to be bona fi de games. Indeed, it is correct for some reason to use the word game to refer to football and tennis, but not to boxing and fencing; cf. the correct sentences (both in Russian and English) Futbol / Tennis—èto igra, Football / Tennis is a game and the incorrect or odd sentences *Boks / Fextovanie—èto igra, *Boxing / Fencing is a game. Categories of actions “Person is walking” and “Person is running.” PROBLEM 2. Give explicit defi nitions of the identifying features for these categories. DISCUSSION. In their typical manifestations walking and running are quite diff erent, as can be seen in fi gure 1. Fig. 1. Typical manifestations of walking and running