Книжная полка Сохранить
Размер шрифта:
А
А
А
|  Шрифт:
Arial
Times
|  Интервал:
Стандартный
Средний
Большой
|  Цвет сайта:
Ц
Ц
Ц
Ц
Ц

Inspired by Bakhtin. Dialogic Methods in the Humanities

Покупка
Артикул: 872296.01.99
Доступ онлайн
1 800 ₽
В корзину
In seven essays, this book offers a tour de force through those seven disciplines in the humanities that lately underwent a fundamental transformation. In order to apply "exact” scientific methods, these disciplines turned away from their very subjects — the understanding of the relationship or a dialogue that underlies the phenomena they are supposed to investigate. The revisionist approach in this book, based on Mikhail Bakhtin’s work, traces the search for common and specific grounds of the humanities, beginning with psychologism through hermeneutics and semiotics up to the present state of self-annihilation. As an alternative, the book seeks to define humanities as the examination of relationships, which offers an array of refreshing perspectives on each field discussed.
Inspired by Bakhtin. Dialogic Methods in the Humanities : монография / Ed. by M. Freise. - Boston : Academic Studies Press, 2018. - 211 с. - ISBN 978-1-61811-739-7. - Текст : электронный. - URL: https://znanium.ru/catalog/product/2239374 (дата обращения: 18.11.2026). – Режим доступа: по подписке.
Фрагмент текстового слоя документа размещен для индексирующих роботов
Inspired
by Bakhtin
Dialogic Methods
in the Humanities


Studies in Comparative Literature and Intellectual History
Series Editor
GALIN TIHANOV (Queen Mary, University of London)



Inspired
by Bakhtin
Dialogic Methods
in the Humanities
•
Edited by
MATTHIAS FREISE 


Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
The bibliographic data for this title is available from the Library of Congress.
ISBN (hardback) 978-1-61811-738-0
ISBN (electronic) 978-1-61811-739-7
© 2018 Academic Studies Press
All rights reserved
Book design by Kryon Publishing Services (P) Ltd.
www.kryonpublishing.com 
Cover design by Ivan Grave
Published by Academic Studies Press in 2018
28 Montfern Avenue
Brighton, MA 02135, USA
press@academicstudiespress.com
www.academicstudiespress.com


Table of Contents
Introduction
vi
Matthias Freise
Internal Dialogism of  Russian Postmodern Literature: 
Polyphony or Schizophrenia?
1
Maria Andrianova
Between Socrates and the Stranger: How Dialogic Are 
Plato’s Dialogues? 
7
Kryštof Boháček
The Dialogic Method in Literary History
25
Matthias Freise
Towards a Dialogical Sociology
51
Michal Kaczmarczyk
Discourses in the Design of Cultural Artifacts
77
Klaus Krippendorff
Attachment Patterns in the Bi-Personal Field 
112
Reinhard Plassmann
Voices in Image: A Methodological and Theoretical Approach 
to the Dialogic Image of the Other with the European 
Image of China as an Example
126
Xiaojing Wang
List of Contributors
175
Index
176


Matthias Freise
PRELIMINARY REMARKS
M
any scholars around the world are inspired by Mikhail Bakhtin’s ideas. 
For them, his using of the term “dialogue” is one of the key concepts 
in the humanities. Despite the abundance of interpretations of Bakhtin’s 
teachings, two fundamental questions regarding his “dialogism” still seem 
to be unanswered: first—do the objects of other humanities have dialogical 
qualities similar to those literature has; second—how can we define a dialogic method of research in the humanities in general, what would be the 
specific qualities of such a method? In this volume, seven scholars—from 
different countries, rooted in different cultures, working in different fields of 
the humanities—propose answers to the following questions: What in my 
field of study can be considered a dialogic approach and why is a dialogic 
approach essential in my field in order to disclose the specific qualities of the 
material to be analyzed? From these two fundamental questions, the specific 
questions in the respective fields of study arise: How dialogic is the intercultural encounter in contemporary cinema? What is dialogic design? What are 
the presuppositions of a successful therapeutic dialogue? On what terms can 
literary history be called dialogic? How dialogic is postmodern authorship? 
How dialogic are Plato’s philosophical dialogues? What distinguishes a dialogical sociology?
 THE HUMANITIES AS A RELATIONAL SCIENCE
From a disciplinary point of view, the above questions seem to be rather 
disparate. It is therefore necessary to explain how they are bound together 
to a common, truly Bakhtinian approach in the humanities. As different as 


vii
the problems are that we encounter in our fields of study, there is one central 
aspect we all have in mind. Mainstream research and practice in the humanities tend to treat their phenomena as “objects” with “properties.” This, we 
are convinced, is not the proper and necessary approach to what we encounter in our disciplines because what the humanities are mainly and commonly 
concerned with are phenomena of relationship. Such phenomena require 
specific—namely, dialogic—approaches. 
All contributions in this volume are inspired by the idea that a dialogic 
approach in their field is necessary, even inevitable. Therefore, they appeal for 
substantial change in the methods of their field. They argue that recent methods of research in the humanities are widely unsuitable for the phenomena 
they examine. How can this be, despite all erudition? Against the background 
of a highly “speculative” thinking in the humanities up to the nineteenth century, in the twentieth century the humanities very much endeavored to become 
more “scientific.” This was, of course, most respectable, but in consequence has 
guided research further and further away from what could be called a specifically 
humanitarian approach, designed for the specific dialogical nature of the phenomena to be examined. The humanities, despite having produced more “exact” 
results than ever, became more and more unspecific in their fields. We are convinced that the scientification of the humanities at the cost of the specificity of 
their research may result, paradoxically, in the loss of their scientific basis. 
Therefore, a dialogical method in the humanities is not yet an “alternative” 
approach. It is, rather, a guideline for finding the most appropriate access to what 
the phenomena of the humanities in fact are: relationships. Sociology should 
investigate social relationships, not countable mental properties of individuals. 
Philosophy (again) should investigate the relationship of the human mind with 
the world, not the properties of language. Literary history should investigate 
the relationship to the past, and neither what “objectively” happened nor what 
we construct to be our history. Theory of design should investigate how design 
is guided by our encounter with the material world and not by the practical 
function of a tool. Theology should be concerned with our relationship to God, 
not with rules fixed in a codex. Psychology should not only understand psyche 
as a living network of relationships, but should also understand the relationship 
of the therapist to his or her patient as a bi-personal field. Literature, last but 
not least, consists of relationships that are neither “objective” nor “subjective,” 
but rather establish cultural “neurons” that form not only a cobweb in which 
we entangle ourselves (Max Weber, Clifford Geertz) but one that opens a wide, 
even endless semantic space for us to move. This space doesn’t bind us, it sets 


viii
us free. There are special techniques necessary to move within this field and to 
sketch the streamlines of it. 
It is, however, noteworthy that our attempts to propagate and legitimate 
dialogic approaches in our fields expose certain significant differences. This 
can be seen especially in Boháček’s philosophical account of Plato’s dialogues, 
and in Kaczmarczyk’s using them to expose an existential concept of dialogue. 
Boháček examines Plato’s philosophical dialogues for their inherent dialogic 
quality, while Kaczmarczyk emphasizes that, in some of them, the existential 
attitude of the participants is necessary to form a “dialogical” dialogue. These 
approaches are not just “different,” they also expose the two opposite sides of 
the same problem: for Boháček, the “internal” necessity of the communication to have a dialogic structure, and for Kaczmarczyk, the “external” necessity 
of the participants to have an existential attitude, which alone opens them to 
real dialogue. Thus, they are both true, just as both sides of a relationship are 
equally true. Here, we have a living example of how the dialogue between two 
disciplines can and should be dialogic. 
There is, however, one problem shared by all disciplines in the humanities, in case they, as they ought to, investigate relationships. Relationships, in 
contrast to objects, are invisible. Rigid scholars conclude that, precisely for this 
reason, they simply do not exist. There is no such thing as a love relationship—
just hormonal processes in the brain; there is no social relationship—just needs 
to be satisfied; there is no relationship to the past—only traces and objects left 
over for examination; there is no relationship within art—just material form and 
content to take notice of; there is no relationship to the world to be understood 
by philosophy—only understandings materialized in language; no relationship 
to the Divine—only religious needs. Of course, we can ignore non-object phenomena, but there is at least one field of relationship that hardly can be ignored, 
and that is language. Ferdinand de Saussure proved that language consists not 
of objects but of relationships, which are labelled by the term “sign.” “Sign” is 
the expression of a relationship. Most illustrative here is the case of phonology. 
Before de Saussure, linguists believed that language consisted of sounds. After 
de Saussure it became clear that it consists of differences between sounds; that 
is, it consists of relationships. A phoneme is not an object, but a relationship. 
You cannot investigate the functioning of language without these differences, 
which cannot be heard directly but have to be reconstructed by juxtaposition. 
The analysis of language as a relationship is called semiotics. It is a long way, 
however, from semiotics to an understanding of all phenomena of the humanities being dialogic. After the “semiotic turn” in the 1960s and 1970s all fields in 


ix
the humanities were subordinated to language. Everything was language. This 
is typical with the humanities and their “turns.” Given the “relational” character 
of one humanitarian discipline, scholars conclude that all cognate disciplines 
are derivations of the one in which this character was encountered. In fact, there 
is no leading discipline in the humanities. Philosophy is not dialogic “because it 
consists of language,” but it is dialogic in the same regard that language is. It has 
its own specific dialogic character which has to be explained within philosophy. 
As a result, we do not harken “back to semiotics.” Even scholars within semiotics 
themselves have not fully understood the relational character of the sign. They 
never performed the mental leap from description to interpretation, because 
interpretation seemed arbitrary to them. Here, the hard labor of convincing 
them is necessary. And this labor can be provided by literary scholarship because 
literary scholarship successfully developed strategies of plausibility within 
a field of concurring interpretations. Of course, even philology has recently 
tended toward “scientification.” Digital humanities, cultural transfer research, 
neuronal reception research, and the revival of the sociology of literature dominate the scene. However, literary analysis has developed the tools to illuminate semantic spaces provided by the “neurons” of literary texts. Therefore, it 
could serve as a pioneer for an alliance between scholars equally frustrated by 
mainstream “exact” research in the humanities. It is this mainstream that also 
tends to repel students at universities. Students expect, for example, genuine 
philosophical understanding, but teachers convince them that “truth is what 
is the case.” At German universities an average of ninety percent of philosophy 
students drop out before the bachelor of arts exam. Mainstream philosophers 
would argue that students expect from philosophy mere “metaphysical speculation” and are not ready to accept that philosophy requires logics, logics, and 
logics. Relationships, however, are no less logical than objects, but the logics of 
relation are different from the logics of property. 
The primary aim of the contributions in this volume is to restore for the 
humanities the goal of dialogic understanding, which requires interpretation. All contributors formulate the dialogic character of the phenomena they 
investigate or of the method they develop. They are convinced that such an 
approach is able to give a fresh outlook on their field of study. At the same time, 
by sharing a dialogic method, we get the chance to unite the humanities in a 
common scientific effort. This provides the humanities with new epistemological power—one that is highly needed, and not only for the humanities as a 
field of study. The humanities are not, in fact, a luxury with which we indulge 


x
ourselves once we have fulfilled our basic needs. The disciplines contributing 
to this volume—and the humanitarian disciplines not represented here—are 
able to solve real problems, that is, problems of relationship. Such problems are 
at least as important as problems we have with objects. And more than a few of 
the problems we believe to have with objects we might turn out to have with 
relationships. 
In what follows, I will trace earlier efforts to find the uniting principle 
of the various disciplines within the humanities. Further, I will try to explain 
what kind of radical switch in our brain is necessary to investigate relationships 
instead of objects. Again and again we are tempted to go back into the object 
mode, and then our insight into the phenomena of the humanities is instantly 
blinded. It is especially hard to adopt the idea that relationships are prior to 
objects, but some thinkers before us understood this well: above all, Immanuel 
Kant, the true pioneer of “relational” understanding. 
DILTHEY’S SEARCH FOR A COMMON GROUND IN ALL 
FIELDS IN THE HUMANITIES
Together with Wilhelm Windelband, Wilhelm Dilthey was the first thinker 
who made an effort to define the common research principle in the humanities 
after they had split into a plethora of disciplines. He saw the problem of legitimation which the humanities were facing after the end of idealistic thought. 
The humanities were accused of having no object, and not undeservedly. 
For idealistic thought, it had been no problem to reflect on the world without having a real object because this thought was sure to be meta-physic, that 
is, pre-empiric, investigating processes that were prior to all possible objects. 
But since then, the winds of science have changed dramatically, and science 
without an object is no longer taken seriously. “Scientific” science had to have 
objects. Therefore, the solution Dilthey aimed at was to demonstrate that the 
humanities also have objects. 
But, like many of his contemporary philosophers at the end of the nineteenth century, he was convinced that the key to having an object would be in 
psychology, since what all fields in the humanities seemed to have in common 
was a sort of psychological substrate, obviously reliant on acts of thinking. 
This substrate could be investigated, and there would be the necessary object, 
and the desired recognition by non-humanitarian sciences. This is why Dilthey 
gave the 1894 treatise in which he performed his ultimate effort to find the 


Доступ онлайн
1 800 ₽
В корзину