Nuclear Energy: Innovation and Role the IAEA

В.М. МУРОГОВ

NUCLEAR ENERGY

INNOVATION AND ROLE THE IAEA

Статья

Москва

ИНФРА-М

2019

УДК 621.039
ББК 31.4

М91

Мурогов В.М.

М91
Nuclear Energy: Innovation and Role the IAEA : статья / 

В.М. Мурогов. — М. : ИНФРА-М, 2019. — 33 с.

ISBN 978-5-16-107763-4 (online)

Для всех интересующихся вопросами ядерной энергетики 

и вкладом Международного агентства по атомной энергии в ее 
развитие.

УДК 621.039

ББК 31.4

ISBN 978-5-16-107763-4 (online)
© Мурогов В.М., 2019

16+

I

1. Innovation and Role the IAEA 

1.1. Shift in Priorities

AtomInfo.Ru, PUBLISHED 31.12.2016

Professor Viktor Murogov joined the IAEA in 1996, i.e. twenty years ago. Today, at the 

request of AtomInfo.Ru correspondents, Viktor Mikhailovich is recollecting his work for the 
Agency - from minor events to actions that caused radical changes in the line of the IAEA 
activity.

In lieu of the foreword

Twenty years ago, by the assignment of Minatom (Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy), 

I joined the IAEA as Deputy Director General and Head of the Department of Nuclear Energy 
(DNE) and also Manager of the IAEA's Major Program 1 (MP1) "Nuclear Power and Fuel 
Cycle".

For the years of work in the Agency, I accumulated vast archives of documents including 

those on the DNE's scientific, technical and organizational issues and initiatives over the 
following trends:

- development of INPRO (innovative projects for NPPs and NFCs),

- development of the IAEA's Program on Nuclear Knowledge Management (cross-cutting 

program),

- elaboration of a new trend called "Comparative Assessment of Nuclear Energy Role for 

Sustainable Energy Development" (Program C - MP1).

The archives accumulated helped create information databases at the MEPhI International 

Center of Nuclear Education and at the Center for Nuclear Knowledge Management of the 
Obninsk Institute of Atomic Energy (IAE) . At those centers, young talented researchers are 
involved in the assessment and development of ideas enclosed in the above programs.

The direct supervisor of this work is A.A. Andrianov, Cand. Sc. (Phys-Math), associate 

professor at the IAE. Owing to his contribution, it became possible to analyze materials required 
for a recorded history of the IAEA activity over the aforementioned trends in 1996 thru 2003, 
and retrace the results of that activity up to the present.

Viktor Murogov, April 2016

Problem of priorities

Viktor Mikhailovich, you came to the IAEA 20 years ago…

Yes, my work for the Agency commenced on January 1, 1996. I was to hold three offices 

at the same time: Deputy Director General, Head of the Department of Nuclear Energy 
("Russian" department), and Manager of the Major Program 1 "Nuclear Power and Fuel Cycle".

What was the situation in the Agency then? What was the IAEA engaged in?

For a more clear understanding of the situation associated with my joining the Agency, 

two aspects of the matter should be considered.

On the one hand, I was not a stranger - I was recommended by the then Minister for 

Atomic Energy Viktor N. Mikhailov as the Head of the Institute of Physics & Power 
Engineering in Obninsk, the largest national nuclear center engaged in the development of fast 
reactors (seven departments, each comparable with an independent research institute, about 
9,000 employees, over 400 doctors and candidates of science at that time).

I had sufficient experience in managing a large organization with considerable financial 

& logistic resources; I was quite experienced in solving research problems, holding talks with 
top officials of Russian nuclear industry and heads of international organizations; I participated 
in the IAEA projects and had personal contacts with the IAEA leaders such as S. Eklund and 
H. Blix.

On the other hand, I came to the IAEA's Department of Nuclear Energy (DNE) 

traditionally headed by, consequently, Soviet and Russian representatives.

It is worth mentioning that Russian nuclear industry had a broad representation in the 

IAEA in that period: about 90 (of 800) experts, which reflected Russia's economic potential and 
the fact that each forth nuclear specialist worked in the Russian Federation.

My predecessor Boris A. Semenov had extensive experience (more than twelve years) in 

international nuclear activity including his work for the IAEA. Before the IAEA, he was the 
Head of the RF Minatom's Department of Foreign Relations (his predecessor was M.N. Ryzhov).

Considering vast experience gained by B. Semenov, I appointed him (despite objections 

on the part of Hans Blix who called it "contradicting to the Agency traditions") first an adviser at 
my office and then a head of the group supervising provision of aid to Russia to improve 
radiation environment.

Hans Blix - Director General (1981 - 1997)

Organizational changes in the Agency took place under the influence of most acute 

events. The DNE's Safety Division, headed by Morris Rosen from the USA (who also was 
H. Blix's advisor) was raised to the Department of Nuclear Safety & Security - DNS, and Mr. 
Rosen was appointed Assistant Deputy Director General of that Department.

On my first working day, I was said: "Dear Professor, all our programs are of two years' 

duration, and that's why we ask you to familiarize yourself with the program of work and abstain 
from any revolutionary changes".

Hans Blix and Моhamed ElBaradei

Global nuclear industry was going then through hard times after such heavy blows as 

TMI-2, Chernobyl, and Iraq. Safety and Security, i.e. safety and physical protection became 
priority lines, and it was quite natural that the IAEA focused on them.

When I was told that safety was the priority and responsibility of DNS, I got surprised as 

I was sure that safety was primarily determined by advanced technologies.

Still, I managed to find a common language with Morris Rosen. Unfortunately, his term 

of office in the new Department appeared rather short. He was succeeded by the Canadian 
Representative Zygmund Domaratzki, who earlier worked as the Director General of the Atomic 
Energy Control Board of Canada. In fact, he was a supervisor in the pure form.

It should be said that our personal relations were good and correct, but each of us became 

tough in promoting departmental interests.

"Viktor", - he said when we first met, - "it is safety that matters whereas technology is 

subordinate to it".

"OK", - I said, - "What airplane is most safe to you mind?" and answered myself: "It is an 

airplane standing permanently on land. But it is of no use to anybody. Just the same with your 
nuclear energy: if it is only safe but unprofitable, it won't be of interest and would be shut down 
in the course of time".

It was the beginning of a war of interests as part of program activities. About a year later, 

Domaratzki submitted a report to the Director General indicating, in particular, as follows: 
"Safety is absolute priority. The Department of Nuclear Energy should work under the financial 
and program supervision of the Department of Safety & Security".

Nuclear-safe conflict

And is it possible? Heads of the IAEA Departments are appointed in compliance with 

quotas for Member States…

Domaratzki did not apply for a position or management. He undertook a politic move by 

proposing to grant him the right to financial monitoring & distribution over all safety-related 
issues.

The IAEA-adopted approach was as follows. Let us assume that DNE has a waste 

program. DNS can participate in it but the distribution of resources is vested in the head of DNE. 
The reverse order is possible as well: DNE can take part in DNS programs but it is the latter that 
would dispose of resources.

By the way, during the DNE reorganization before my appointment, the newly 

established DNS "inherited" - along with corresponding structures - very experienced specialists 
such as Annick Carnino from France (now she heads the French Civic Supervision of NPP 
Safety) and Abel Julio Gonzalez, a real Argentinian hidalgo, a very experienced nuclear expert, 
who devoted most of his life to the problems of nuclear safety and radiation protection.

As a result, employees and heads of sections in both Departments preserved good 

business relations.

However, notwithstanding the mid-level managers' desire to keep participation in 

programs at the former level, the general tendency - highest priority to safety - was leading to the 
reduction of the "technology" trend.

As to me, I was trying to extend - whenever possible - technology issues. Take, for 

example, the problem of waste. Though nuclear & radiation safety is of great importance there, 
an advanced technology would be required for long-run solution of the problem.

A similar problem for the Agency discussions of those days: who should be responsible 

for NPP safety, nuclear regulator or operator?

The conflict rose up to the ElBaradei level. For me, it was my first serious talk with the 

new Director General.

"Viktor, your colleague Domaratzki thinks that you should work under his financial 

supervision. We can't transfer employees from one department to another, but he wants to get 
entire control of funds", said ElBaradei.

What should I proceed? Actually, the matter in question concerned putting the IAEA's 

"Russian" department (DNE) under outside financial and program control. The way out should 
be found at once.

"Dear DG (Director General), I think that one Dr. ElBaradei is quite enough. I don't need 

a parallel chief."

The answer was to the liking of ElBaradei but not to Domaratzki's. What was the end of 

this story? Sometime after that, Domaratzki retired for health reasons. He was sorry for himself 
but could not agree to the rejection of his proposal.

You asked me about the situation in the Agency at that time. Just imagine what it was 

like if I not once had to intercede at the Director General (DG) meetings for employees facing 
dismissal for a principal position.

Supposing we fire a specialist, formerly a very experienced chief engineer of a big NPP. 

And who will remain? Outstanding administrators? Even at the time we could observe 
discussions on the role of the so-called "phony managers" (a mixture of manager and salesman).

Now I speak of a real incident - an attempt to refuse renewal of a contract with some 

employee for "incorrect behavior" because that employee lost his temper and called such "phony 
manager" a non-professional.

Agency Information and its role

The IAEA Department of Nuclear Energy was traditionally considered as "Russian". 

Certainly, the DNS separation weakened its position. There was no use opposing the General 
Conference's decision, and H. Blix (Director General in 1981 thru 1997) told me: "Viktor, you'll 
have to live with this reality".

But that was not the end of problems. The Department of Management is traditionally 

considered "American" - by analogy with the "Russian" Department because its Head is 
appointed on behalf of the United States and is not elected by the Board of Governors. 
Moreover, the US's contribution to the IAEA is one of the largest, and Americans arrived at an 
idea about an excessive influence of the "Russian" Department.

The point is that the Department of Nuclear Energy historically incorporated a library and 

the world's largest nuclear information system INIS as a basis for scientific-technical activity in 
the field of nuclear power.

Americans proposed (the decision was taken during DNE separation) a scheme under 

which Russia would retain those subdivisions but it is the Department of Management that 
would determine for them plans of actions because "the Agency should have common 
information support".

I tried to object: "You are going to establish common control over provisions of office 

equipment, foodstuffs for dining-rooms and nuclear technology?" Arguments were not taken into 
account, and control over subdivisions became dual: employees' work supervised by DNE while 
programs of work and funds, by Americans (Department of Management).

I did not lose heart. For three years, I regularly rose up this question at the DG meetings 

and wrote memos. I placed emphasis on the fact that in the Member States' opinion, this strange 
symbiosis of atom and sausage pointed to the lack of professionalism in the Agency, reducing 
efficiency of work and protection of sensitive information (especially in the context of terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001).

The last circumstance along with my insistence and regular reports, probably, helped 

breach the wall because my opponents decided to meet half-way and commence negotiations.

The essence of discussion looked as follows. "Dear Viktor", they would say, "to make 

you understand the subject-matter, we are ready to tell you what we need INIS for".

"I know this. The INIS Project was launched at the request of developing countries to 

facilitate distribution and exchange of nuclear information".

"Yes, it is specified so in the Statute. Actually, INIS is an indicator of nuclear activity the 

world over. We want you to see yourself how it is realized in practice.

During the next business trip to the US, I visited a certain National Lab, where I was 

shown departments engaged in the assessment of data and forecast of situations in various fields 
of activity all over the world. Weather forecast and agriculture in Africa were taken as an 
example.

"Weather forecast, crop yields, invasion of vermin… What influence can these factors 

exert on the population and on a political situation?"

"Viktor, we are to know where this or that kind of aid is needed".

On the IAEA demands, the world's leading nuclear labs carry out a good deal of analyses 

of nuclear activity the world over, and the INIS project is one of data-flows for those analyses.

"If you are planning to return INIS to your department, you should think about 

responsibility you would take for part of our work. We don't object; we are pleased to see that it 
is experts who are making analyses provided they know exactly what those analyses are required 
for".

And what was the end of this story?

In the library and in the INIS project, I am still called the man who succeeded in 

separating scientific & technical information (books) from sausages.

With E.P. Velilkhov, President of the Kurchatov Institute, 

and Assistant DDG NE- Yanko Yanev.

Formation of the Affinity group as a basis for reviving the role of the Department and 

its program - as the basic IAEA program

How did you start your work as the Head of the Department and the Manager of 

Program MP1?

No matter what my home experience might be, I realized that I almost rushed into a hell 

of problems - from the head of a research institution to practically the highest "nuclear" post to 
be taken by a Russian representative in an international organization like the UN or IAEA.

The formation of a group of like-minded professionals was evident to me.

To avoid misunderstanding of the situation with the IAEA personnel, I must say that 

many positions in the Agency were and are occupied by skilled professionals who passed 
through a tough selection. If, for example, an employee from Argentina or India worked in DNE, 
I was sure that in his country he was considered one of the best specialists.

The IAEA managers were also noted for a high skill but with national traditions and 

peculiarities (graduates from national schools). Similar to any UN structure (about forty 
organizations), the Agency sometimes failed to get adapted to operating principles they brought 
from their native countries.

The IAEA's competitive personnel selection was rather flexible and rational. As a result, 

a team entitled the "DDG-NE Office" was formed in a fairly short period.

The team incorporated as follows:

- two high-skill technical secretaries (knowledge of several foreign languages, experience of 

international and diplomatic work over fifteen years);

- two advisors in administrative and financial issues (Cambridge education and fine English);

- two advisors in coordination of program activity (former Deputy Director Generals of DNE and 

DNS);

- advisor - coordinator of interoffice activity (level of a Minister of nuclear energy in a West
European country).

In addition (which was unusual for the Agency), I established weekly meetings attended 

by the whole of the DDG-NE Office and heads of all DNE divisions and sections with the issue 
of protocols and decisions available on the IAEA employees site for information and control of 
execution.

An unexpected effect showed up in half a year, when the administration of the IAEA 

buildings (building A, our floor A-26) informed us that ventilation systems would supply air to 
the Agency buildings till 19:00. As a result, work after 19:00 became impossible due to the lack 
of fresh air.

The explanation was as follows: "Viktor, similar to you, your employees keep late hours 

thus breaking corresponding trade-union rules. For moral reasons, they cannot leave the office 
while you are here". Since then, we finished our working day at 19:00.

At first sight, all I am speaking about is just trifles. It is not so. We had great ideas aimed 

at rekindling the glory of the "Russian" Department along with its key role in the IAEA activity, 
but we were first to solve organizational issues and improve the working process.

Here is an example. Under ElBaradei, an experienced manager, former Minister for 

Atomic Energy of Algeria was appointed head of the Planning Section. His work style was to 
ElBaradei's liking because they both followed one and the same management strategy "Programs 
should be result-oriented". This concept, which was popular in many organizations and 
institutions, reappeared not long ago.

For instance, from their point of view, it was inadmissible to be constantly involved in 

one reactor type, e.g. PWR/VVER. Reactor types should be regularly changed in the program. I 
was surprised: "It means that in the 1st quarter I finish gathering data on PWR, and in the 2nd 
quarter I should pass to the developments of fast reactors? It is like an anecdote!"

Still further, the Planning Section elaborated and introduced a scientifically based system 

of points, criteria etc. to assess employees' labor efficiency and also other things that could be of 
interest to "phony managers".

All the above was rather interesting until my employees complained at one of regular 

meetings: "Viktor, we have no time for work, we spend all time on filling various forms and 
making reports - on planning, fulfillment criteria, and so on".