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Review of Business and Economics Studies, 2014, том 2, № 2

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Review of Business and Economics Studies, 2014, том 2, № 2: Журнал - :, 2014. - 80 с.: ISBN. - Текст : электронный. - URL: https://znanium.com/catalog/product/1014576 (дата обращения: 06.05.2024). – Режим доступа: по подписке.
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Review of  
Business and 
Economics  
Studies

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
Prof. Alexander Ilyinsky
Dean, International Finance Faculty, 
Financial University, Moscow, Russia
ailyinsky@fa.ru 

EXECUTIVE EDITOR
Dr. Alexander Kaffka

EDITORIAL BOARD

Dr. Mark Aleksanyan
Adam Smith Business School, 
The Business School, University 
of Glasgow, UK

Prof. Edoardo Croci
Research Director, IEFE Centre for 
Research on Energy and Environmental 
Economics and Policy, Università 
Bocconi, Italy

Prof. Moorad Choudhry
Dept.of Mathematical Sciences, Brunel 
University, UK

Prof. David Dickinson 
Department of Economics, Birmingham 
Business School, University of 
Birmingham, UK

Prof. Chien-Te Fan
Institute of Law for Science and 
Technology, National Tsing Hua 
University, Taiwan

Prof. Wing M. Fok
Director, Asia Business Studies, College 
of Business, Loyola University New 
Orleans, USA

Prof. Konstantin P. Gluschenko
Faculty of Economics, Novosibirsk State 
University, Russia

Prof. George E. Halkos
Associate Editor in Environment and 
Development Economics, Cambridge 
University Press; Director of Operations 
Research Laboratory, University of 
Thessaly, Greece

Dr. Christopher A. Hartwell
President, CASE - Center for Social and 
Economic Research, Warsaw, Poland

Prof. S. Jaimungal
Associate Chair of Graduate 
Studies, Dept. Statistical Sciences 
& Mathematical Finance Program, 
University of Toronto, Canada

Prof. Bartlomiej Kaminski
University of Maryland, USA; 

Rzeszow University of Information 
Technology and Management,  
Poland

Prof. Vladimir Kvint 
Chair of Financial Strategy, Moscow 
School of Economics, Moscow State 
University, Russia

Prof. Alexander Melnikov 
Department of Mathematical and 
Statistical Sciences, University of 
Alberta, Canada

Prof. George Kleiner
Deputy Director, Central Economics and 
Mathematics Institute, Russian Academy 
of Sciences, Russia

Prof. Kwok Kwong
Director, Asian Pacific Business 
Institute, California State University, Los 
Angeles, USA

Prof. Dimitrios Mavrakis
Director, Energy Policy and 
Development Centre, National and 
Kapodistrian University of Athens, 
Greece

Prof. Steve McGuire
Director, Entrepreneurship Institute, 
California State University, Los Angeles, 
USA

Prof. Rustem Nureev
Head of the Department of 
Macroeconomics, Financial University, 
Russia

Dr. Oleg V. Pavlov
Associate Professor of Economics and 
System Dynamics, Department of Social 
Science and Policy Studies, Worcester 
Polytechnic Institute, USA

Prof. Boris Porfiriev
Deputy Director, Institute of Economic 
Forecasting, Russian Academy of 
Sciences, Russia

Prof. Svetlozar T. Rachev
Professor of Finance, College of 
Business, Stony Brook University, USA

Prof. Boris Rubtsov
Chair of Financial Markets and 
Financial Engineering, Financial 
University, Russia

Dr. Minghao Shen
Dean, Center for Cantonese Merchants 
Research, Guangdong University of 
Foreign Studies, China

Prof. Dmitry Sorokin
Deputy Director, Institute of Economy, 
Russian Academy of Sciences, Head of 
the Department of Macroeconomics 
Regulation, Financial University, Russia

Prof. Robert L. Tang
Vice Chancellor for Academic, De La 
Salle College of Saint Benilde, Manila, 
The Philippines

Dr. Dimitrios Tsomocos 
Saïd Business School, Fellow in 
Management, University of Oxford; 
Senior Research Associate, Financial 
Markets Group, London School 
of Economics, UK

Prof. Sun Xiaoqin
Dean, Graduate School of Business, 
Guangdong University of Foreign 
Studies, China

REVIEW OF BUSINESS 
AND ECONOMICS STUDIES 
(ROBES) is the quarterly peerreviewed scholarly journal published 
by the Financial University under 
the Government of Russian 
Federation, Moscow. Journal’s 
mission is to provide scientific 
perspective on wide range of topical 
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ISSN 2308-944X

Вестник 
исследований 
бизнеса и  
экономики

ГЛАВНЫЙ РЕДАКТОР
А.И. Ильинский, профессор, декан 
Международного финансо вого факультета Финансового университета 

ВЫПУСКАЮЩИЙ РЕДАКТОР
А.В. Каффка

РЕДАКЦИОННЫЙ СОВЕТ

М. М. Алексанян, профессор Бизнесшколы им. Адама Смита, Университет 
Глазго (Великобритания)

К. Вонг, профессор, директор Института азиатско-тихоокеанского бизнеса 
Университета штата Калифорния, 
Лос-Анджелес (США)

К. П. Глущенко, профессор Экономического факультета Новосибирского 
госуниверситета

С. Джеимангал, профессор Департамента статистики и математических финансов Университета Торонто 
(Канада)

Д. Дикинсон, профессор Департамента экономики Бирмингемской бизнесшколы, Бирмингемский университет 
(Великобритания)

Б. Каминский, профессор, 
Мэрилендский университет (США); 
Университет информационных 
технологий и менеджмента в Жешове 
(Польша)

В. Л. Квинт, заведующий кафедрой 
финансовой стратегии Московской 
школы экономики МГУ, профессор 
Школы бизнеса Лассальского университета (США)

Г. Б. Клейнер, профессор, член-корреспондент РАН, заместитель директора Центрального экономико-математического института РАН

Э. Крочи, профессор, директор по 
научной работе Центра исследований 
в области энергетики и экономики 
окружающей среды Университета 
Боккони (Италия)

Д. Мавракис, профессор, директор 
Центра политики и развития энергетики Национального университета 
Афин (Греция)

С. Макгвайр, профессор, директор 
Института предпринимательства 
Университета штата Калифорния, 
Лос-Анджелес (США)

А. Мельников, профессор Департа мента математических и статистических исследований 
Университета провинции Альберта 
(Канада)

Р. М. Нуреев, профессор, заведующий кафедрой «Макроэкономика» 
Финансового университета

О. В. Павлов, профессор Депар тамента по литологии и полити ческих 
исследований Ворчестерского 
политехнического института (США) 

Б. Н. Порфирьев, профессор,  
член-корреспондент РАН, заместитель директора Института 
народнохозяйственного прогнозирования РАН

С. Рачев, профессор Бизнес-колледжа Университета Стони Брук (США) 

Б. Б. Рубцов, профессор, заведующий кафедрой «Финансовые рынки 
и финансовый инжиниринг» Финансового университета

Д. Е. Сорокин, профессор, 
член-корреспондент РАН, 
заместитель директора Института 
экономики РАН, заведующий 
кафедрой «Макроэкономическое 
регулирование» Финансового 
университета

Р. Тан, профессор, проректор 
Колледжа Де Ла Саль Св. Бенильды 
(Филиппины) 

Д. Тсомокос, Оксфордский университет, старший научный сотрудник 
Лондонской школы экономики (Великобритания)

Ч. Т. Фан, профессор, Институт 
права в области науки и технологии, 
национальный университет Цин Хуа 
(Тайвань)

В. Фок, профессор, директор по 
исследованиям азиатского бизнеса 
Бизнес-колледжа Университета Лойола (США)

Д. Е. Халкос, профессор, Университет Фессалии (Греция)

К. А. Хартвелл, президент Центра 
социальных и экономических исследований CASE (Польша)

М. Чудри, профессор, Университет 
Брунеля (Великобритания)

Сун Цяокин, профессор, декан Высшей школы бизнеса Гуандунского 
университета зарубежных исследований (КНР)

М. Шен, декан Центра кантонских 
рыночных исследований Гуандунского университета (КНР)

Издательство Финансового 
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Интернет: www.robes.fa.ru.

Журнал «Review of Business and 
Economics Studies» («Вест ник 
исследований бизнеса и экономики») зарегистрирован 
в Федеральной службе по надзору в сфере связи, информационных технологий и массовых 
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16+

CONTENTS

Effect of Income on Political Preferences of Russian voters

Rustem Nureev, Sergey Shulgin 5

The Lessons from the Insistence of the U.S.A. in Nuclear Energy Policy

Wen-Hsiang Kung  28

Recent Development of New Energy Policy and Legislation in Taiwan, with the 

Focus on Promotion of Biofuel

Yueh-Hsun Tsai 42

Priority Issues for Boosting Smart Grid-Smart Customers in Taiwan

Wen-Ling Sun 51

“Social Impact Bonds”: Implications for Government and Non-Profit 

Organizations

Antonio Costa, Paolo Leoci, Alessandra Tafuro 58

Social Media’s Role in Intellectual Capital’s Growth

Michał Falkowski 66

The Need to Design a Quality System for Macedonian Textile Companies

Elizabeta Mitreva, Nako Taskov  75

Review of  
Business and 
Economics  
Studies

Volume 2, Number 2, 2014

CОДЕРЖАНИЕ

Влияние уровня доходов на политические предпочтения российских 

избирателей

Рустем Нуреев, Сергей Шульгин 5

Использование опыта США при формировании политики в области атомной 

энергетики

Вень-Сянь Кунь  28

Новая энергетическая политика и законодательство Тайваня, направленные 

на внедрение биотоплива

Юэ-Сунь Цай 42

Приоритетные вопросы развития «умных сетей электроснабжения» в Тайване

Вэнь-Линь Сунь 51

«Социальные облигации» и их применение в государственных 

и некоммерческих организациях

Антонио Коста, Паоло Леучи, Алессандра Тафуро 58

Роль социальных медиа в увеличении интеллектуального капитала

Михал Фальковский 66

Создание системы обеспечения качества для текстильных компаний 

Македонии

Элизабета Митрева, Нако Тасков   75

Вестник 
исследований 
бизнеса и  
экономики

№ 2, 2014

Review of Business and Economics Studies  
 
Volume 2, Number 2, 2014

Effect of Income on Political Preferences 
of Russian Voters*

Rustem NUREEV, Doctor of economics, Professor
Head of Macroeconomics Department, Financial University; Professor at National Research University — Higher School 
of Economics, Moscow
nureev50@gmail.com

Sergey ShUlgiN, Ph.D. in economics
Russian Academy for National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), Moscow
sergey@shulgin.ru

Abstract. There was direct correlation between the voters’ income and electoral support for incumbent in 
Russia during the 1990-s and early 2000-s. The results of election to the State Duma (the parliament) in 2011 
and Russia’s presidential elections in 2012 show the opposite. Using income data and electoral results in the 
Russian regions for each candidate (G. Zyuganov, S. Mironov, V. Zhirinovsky, M. Prokhorov, V. Putin) we defined the 
level of electoral support in different income groups. Results show the substantial changes in last 8 years in 
voting behavior. There is the effect of Putin’s inversed threshold and the greatest proportion of votes negatively 
correlated (–1.58), with a group of people with incomes of 14,250 to 21,250 rub/month. Such inverse correlation 
may be due to a protest voting. Putin’s electoral support has a positive correlation in low-income group. In this 
paper we analyze the determinants of voting behavior and show how the income distribution affects the voters’ 
political preferences (based on the results of the presidential elections in 2012). For each candidate we defined 
the level of electoral support in different income groups. Also we analyzed income distribution of absent voters.

Аннотация. В статье анализируются детерминанты электорального поведения и показывается, каким 
образом распределение населения по доходам влияет на политические предпочтения избирателей 
(по итогам федеральных выборов 2012 г.) Определен пороговый уровень доходов, при достижении которого 
люди начинают проявлять социальную активность и заинтересованность в участии в электоральной 
системе (демократии). Показано влияние распределения доходов в российских регионах на политические 
предпочтения избирателей.

Key words: Political preferences, regional studies, electoral behavior, income distribution.

* Влияние уровня доходов на политические предпочтения российских избирателей.

1. REVIEw

S. Kuznets was the one of the first who showed the importance of the distribution of income inequality for 
economic growth and social and economic progress 
(Kuznets, 1955; 1971; 1979). However, the focus of his 
research was not the problem of electoral behavior of 
voters. Almost ten years later, it becomes the subject 
of a special study (Lewis-Beck, 1988). Analyzing the 
Western democracies, the author suggested indirect, 
but reliable way to assess the economic factors on the 
electoral process. The book summarizes and complements the classical set of economic factors to explain 
the behavior of voters. M. Lewis-Beck believes that the 
majority of voters rarely appeal to the main macroeco
nomic indicators in assessing the economic situation 
and prospects of the economy.
According to M. Lewis-Beck, changes in voters’ disposable income also have minor effects on electoral 
behavior. This paradox can be partly explained by 
the weak faith of the population in the government’s 
ability to influence the personal financial situation 
(by arguments like: “The economic policy of the government matters, but does not affect me”). According to sociological researches in 1980-s, influence of 
government policy on personal well-being was felt by 
only 45% of population in UK, 44% in France, 40% in 
Germany, 34% in Italy, 49% in Spain, and only 20% in 
USA. Lewis-Beck uses his survey to show that in almost 
all the developed capitalist countries, the economic 

Review of Business and Economics Studies  
 
Volume 2, Number 2, 2014

reasons are the most important in the vote. The motives of party self-identification (right/left in Europe, 
the Republicans/Democrats in the U.S.), appear much 
stronger than the motives of social or religious identity. 
The following factors strengthen the economic value of 
vote: the openness of the national economy, economic 
growth or its expectation, the presence of the ruling 
coalition or single party government. Among the developed countries studied by Lewis-Beck, the economic 
motives of the electoral behavior are mostly significant 
in the United States. In any case, the economic motive 
affects voting through the personal assessment of the 
economic development of the country’s voters.
For assessment Lewis-Beck suggests three components: “Retrospective” (evaluation of the past compared to the present), “Prospective” (assessment of the 
future) and “Affective” (unexplained irritation, etc.). 
According to his study, the most important is “Prospective” evaluation of public policies, the second — “affective” component and the last — “retrospective” component of assessment.
Respondents were asked to rate the influence of 
the government on unemployment, inflation, personal well-being, balance of trade, economic growth, 
public debt and a number of other parameters. Unemployment was the most important parameter in 
all countries (UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain) and 
inflation was on the second place. Other parameters 
(such as personal well-being, balance of trade, economic growth, public debt, etc.) were significantly less 
important than unemployment and inflation. We can 
see from Lewis-Beck that voters in Western democracies assess their economic situation and current trends 
primarily through their assessment of the future.
According to R. Kiewiet and D. Rivers (1984) voters are not inclined to attach great importance to the 
current macroeconomic situation. Authors believed 
that voters were rather farsighted than myopic, and 
votes do not tend to react with enthusiasm for the 
short-time economic improvement. Voters do not 
live by one day and are able to assess the dynamics of 
the economic situation. The authors in their studies 
used “Eurobarometer” data by George Gallup Institute. 
The authors suggested that economic motives of voting were particularly strong in the case of deterioration of the situation. Growth of economic indicators, 
as it turned out, did not lead to a significant increase 
of electoral support for incumbent. Economic growth 
matters only in case of a sharp change of direction in 
economic development (the typical example — Ronald 
Reagan’s victory in the presidential election in 1984).
A. Sobyanin and B. Suhovolskiy (1995) studied the 
electoral process in Russia and demonstrated numerous examples of electoral frauds using electoral sta
tistics. According to A. Lavrov (1997) social structure 
affects voters’ political preferences. Lavrov argued that 
the higher share of urban population and share of population employed by the government (in public administration and state industry) and the share of people 
with tertiary education lead to the stronger electoral 
support for centrist and democratic candidates. And 
vice versa, support for the left politicians in 1990-s increased with a higher share of rural and agrarian population and with higher share of pensioners.
L. Smirnayagin (1999) studied the stability of political preferences and proposed a “degradation index”, 
to explain the shifts in voters’ political preferences. 
He estimated degradation index for Russia in 1990-s 
as 0.54. This means that 54% of the voters were ready 
to change their political preferences in the next election. This high percentage of voters who were ready to 
switch their preference means that formation of civil 
society in Russia is uncompleted.
V. Mau, O. Kochetkova, K. Yanovsky, S. Zhavoronkov, 
Yu. Lomakina (2000) studied the impact of different 
economics indications on electoral behavior. They argued that in late 90-s (1995–2000) the most important 
for electoral behavior were income and wages, tax payments, share of urban population. At that period the 
higher was the voters’ income (wages etc.) the higher 
was support for ruling party. The similar findings were 
in later studies by O. Kochetkova (2004), according to 
which the support for incumbent politicians positively 
correlated with incomes and negatively correlated with 
unemployment and wage arrears.
U. Seresova (2005) agued that economic indicators 
were significant for the electoral process but were not 
the most important ones. She suggested that electoral 
behavior was better explained by the level of regional 
modernization and the role of traditional culture.
However, most of studies analyzed the situation of 
the electoral behavior of the 1990-s and early twentyfirst century. In this paper we deal with a new political 
reality. In this article we further develop the approach 
suggested by S. Shulgin (2005) who examined how income distribution in different countries affected democratic institutions. Author used income distribution 
to analyze the levels of freedom of press measured by 
Freedom House.

2. DATA

In this paper we use official Russia’s electoral statistics 
for presidential election 2012. All our findings consequently contain errors associated with reliability of official electoral statistics. There is an extensive literature 
that indicated the frauds during Russian elections. We 
discussed this problem in several articles (Economic Sub
Review of Business and Economics Studies  
 
Volume 2, Number 2, 2014

jects, 2010, etc.). The article (Enikolopov et al., 2013) discusses the results of the parliamentary elections in 2011. 
Authors compared election results in Moscow precincts 
attended by independent observers, with the election 
results in precinct where observers were not allowed.
The second part of our data describes income levels 
and income distributions in Russian regions. This statistics come from Russian Statistical Agency (RusStat). 
RusStat estimates income distribution based on data 
from the Household Budget Survey (HBS). Household 
Budget Survey was carried out by state statistics on a 
regular basis in all regions of the Russian Federation. 
The unit of observation in this survey is the household 
and its members.

3. DATA ANAlySIS

Using statistics on income level and income distribution, for each region we construct income distribution 
function. Income distribution function for given level 
of income evaluates the share of people within region 
who have such level of income.
RusStat’s statistical yearbook “Regions of Russia” 
(Regiony Rossii, 2011) in Table 5.9 gives the distribution of population by per capita income (as a share of 
regional population). Table 5.8 (from yearbook) gives 
the share of total income by 20 per cent population 
groups (from the poorest 20% of population to the 
richest 20% of population).
We use data on income distribution and per capita 
income level to construct cumulative function that 
shows how many people has income below a certain 
value. For example, in the Belgorod region 4.2% of 
people have incomes of up to 3,500 rubles, 6.3% from 
3 500 to 5 000 rubles, 10.6% from 5 000 to 7 000 rubles, 16.2% from 7 000 to 10000, 21.4% from 10 000 to 
15 000, 23.0% from 15 000 to 25 000, 9.5% from 25 000 
to 35 000 and 8.8% of disposable income — over 35 000 
rubles per month (see Table 1).
Then, in the Belgorod region cumulative function 
of income shows that 4.2% of people have incomes of 
up to 3 500 rubles, 10.5% to 5 000 rubles, 21.1% up to 
7 000 rubles, 37.3% to 10 000, 58.7% to 15 000, 81.7% to 
25 000, 91.2% to 35 000, and the remaining 8.8% — of 
disposable income over 35 000 rubles a month.

For each region we build a linear approximation of 
the distribution function of per capita income (see the 
example in Figure 1). To determine how many people 
in the Belgorod region have income less than 6 000 rubles, we find average on intervals of distribution function 5 000 (10.5%) and 7.000 (21.1%), and the resulting 
15.8%.
Income distribution data exist for 82 Russia’s regions (for all 83 regions in Russia, with exception of 
Republic of Chechnya).
We use income distribution functions for each region to construct the variable “share of population with 
incomes below X”. Figure 2 shows the distribution of 
Russia’s regions by this variable (“share of population 
with incomes below X”) on 4 different X (Fig2a X=5000 
rubles per month, Fig2b X=10 000 rubles per month, Fig2c X=20 000 rubles per month, Fig2d X=30 000 rubles per 
month)We use electoral statistics to construct electoral 
variable “the share of votes for candidate N”. We estimated “the share of votes for candidate N” as a share of 
voters participated in president election. We constructed electoral variables for all five candidates (Zhirinovsky, Zyuganov, Mironov, Prokhorov, Putin). Also we constructed electoral variable for non-voters — as a share 
of voters who were registered but did not participate.
Next, we looked for correlations between income 
variables “share of population with incomes below X” 
and electoral variables “the share of votes for candidate N”.
On Figure 3 presented scatterplots for electoral 
variable “share of votes for Zhirinovsky” and income 
variable “share of population with incomes below X” for 
different X (Fig3a X=5000 rubles per month, Fig3b 
X=10 000 rubles per month, Fig3c X=20 000 rubles per 
month, Fig3d X=30 000 rubles per month)On each 
scatterplot on Figure 3, vertical axis represents the 
same electoral variable (“share of votes for Zhirinovsky”) 
and horizontal axis — income variable “share of population with incomes below X” for different income levels 
(5000, 10000, 20000, 30000 rubles per month)
Figures 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 present scatterplots (“income 
variable” vs “electoral variable”) for other candidates 
(Fig. 4: for Zyuganov, Fig. 5: for Mironov, Fig. 6: for 
Prokhorov, Fig. 7 for Putin, Fig. 8: for non-voters.)

Table 1. Distribution of population by per capita income (as a percentage of the total for the Belgorod Region, 2010).

Per capita income, rub. per month

to 
3500,0
from 
3500,1 to 
5000,0

from 
5000,1 
to 7000,0

from 
7000,1 
to 10000,0

from 
10000,1 
to 15000,0

from 
15000,1 
to 25000,0

from 
25000,1 
to 35000,0

more 
35000,0

Belgorod region
4,2
6,3
10,6
16,2
21,4
23,0
9,5
8,8

Source: Regiony Rossii, 2011.

Review of Business and Economics Studies  
 
Volume 2, Number 2, 2014

a) 
b) 

c) 

 

d) 

Figure 2. Distribution of Russian regions by the share of people with incomes less then:
a) 5000 rubles per month, b) 10 000 rubles per month, c) 20 000 rubles per month, d) 30 000 rubles per month.

Figure 1. Example of cumulative distribution function approximation of average monthly income (for the Belgorod region, 2010).

Review of Business and Economics Studies  
 
Volume 2, Number 2, 2014

4. MODEl: ElECTORAl bEhAVIOR AND 
INCOME DISTRIbuTION

Previously we defined electoral variables as “the share of 
votes for candidate N” and income variables as “share of 
population with incomes below X”. In our analysis we are 
looking for correlations between electoral variables and 
income variables. We analyze such correlations on all 
possible income levels (up to 100 000 rubles per month).
To analyze correlation between electoral and income 
variables we used model of simple pair regression (1):

Share of votes
a
a

Share of population with income

_
_

_
_
_
_
_

 
 
 

 







0
1
less than X
e
_
_

.
 (1)

The advantage of this approach is simplicity (since 
we use a large number of such pairs of simple regression to assess the most relevant interval). At the same 
time, simple regression leaves many possible interpretations in addition to correlation between the independent 
and the dependent variables. For example, we can expect that income depends on other variables, which also 
affect the electoral preferences (level of urbanization, 

education level, gender, age, etc.). Realizing that this approach can be criticized, we nonetheless underscore its 
advantage. It reveals the link between income and electoral support for the candidate. Many other important 
variables (education, urbanization, gender, age) are correlated with income, but we are interested in correlation 
between electoral behaviors of different income groups.
Figure 9 shows the distribution parameter estimation 
of the set of regressions where the dependent variable is 
the share of the vote for Zhirinovsky, and the explanatory variable is the “share of population with incomes below 
X”. Figure 9a shows the distribution of F-statistics, and 
Figure 9b — the distribution of t-statistics of the coefficient of the explanatory variable.
In simple regression F-statistics coincides with the 
absolute value of t-statistics, we use t-statistics when the 
sign is important. Sign in the t-statistics is the sign of 
correlation between dependent and independent variables. The negative sign indicates the negative correlation 
between the share of votes for a candidate and a share of 
people with certain level of income.
In Figure 9b points 1–4 correspond to the results 
of the regression estimates, based on data that are dis
Figure 3. The share of votes for Zhirinovsky (vertical axis) vs. “share of people with incomes less then”:
a) 5000 rubles per month, b) 10 000 rubles per month, c) 20 000 rubles per month, d) 30 000 rubles per month.

a) 
b) 

 

c) 
d)

 

Review of Business and Economics Studies  
 
Volume 2, Number 2, 2014

played in Fig. 3a — 3d. Point 1 in Fig. 9b corresponds to 
the t-statistic (–4.60) for the coefficient of the explanatory variable b (–0.155) regression, based on data in Fig. 
3a (for the income share of less than 5 thousand rubles). 
Point 2 in Fig. 9b corresponds to the t-statistic (–3.75) 
for the coefficient of the explanatory variable b (–0.0687) 
regression, constructed from data in Figure 3b (for revenue share is less than 10 thousand rubles.). Point 3 in Fig. 
9b corresponds to the t-statistic (–2.818) for the coefficient of the explanatory variable b (–0.045) regression, 
based on data in Fig. 3c (for revenue share is less than 20 

thousand rubles.). Point 4 in Fig. 9b corresponds to the 
t-statistic (–2.198) for the coefficient of the explanatory 
variable b (–0.045) regression, based on data in Fig. 3c 
(for revenue share is less than 30 thousand rubles.)
In addition to the four points (1–4), for which we 
have provided examples of the distribution of votes and 
the percentage of people with a certain level of income 
(in Fig. 3a-3d), the graph 9b contains coefficients of tstatistics for the income groups built around a set of distributed income from 0 to 100 thousand rubles. Five percent significance level t-statistics (for 82 observations) 

a)

 

b)

 

c)

 

d)

 

Figure 4. The share of votes for Zyuganov (vertical axis) vs. “share of people with incomes less then”:
a) 5000 rubles per month, b) 10 000 rubles per month, c) 20 000 rubles per month, d) 30 000 rubles per month.

Review of Business and Economics Studies  
 
Volume 2, Number 2, 2014

corresponds to the level of 1.99 (5%), which on the Fig. 
9b reaches a level of income 35 thousand rub. The coefficient of the variable “proportion of people with incomes 
below the X” is no longer statistically significant when x 
is greater than 35 thousand rubles per month, in regressions explaining the share of votes cast for Zhirinovsky.
Similarly graphs 9a, 9b present the results of regressions explaining the share of votes for Zhirinovsky’s 
presidential election in 2012, if the schedule 9a contains 
the results of regression in which the share of votes for 
Zhirinovsky explained by the percentage of people with 

incomes from 0 to X, and a deferred variable on the horizontal axis, then the graph 9c shows the results that explain the voting share for Zhirinovsky in the proportion 
of people with income from Y to X. The curves shown in 
the graph 9a, a special case of the reduced dependence 
in graph 9c (at Y = 0).
In the graph 9c we consider all possible income 
groups, for example, not only income group from 0 to 
5000 (point 1 on the chart 9a and Figure 3a), but also 
of income from 1000 to 5000, from 2000 to 5000, from 
3000 to 5000, from 4000 to 5000, not only income group 

Figure 5. The share of votes for Mironov (vertical axis) vs. “share of people with incomes less then”:
a) 5000 rubles per month, b) 10 000 rubles per month, c) 20 000 rubles per month, d) 30 000 rubles per month.

a)

 

b)

 

c) 

 

d)

 

Review of Business and Economics Studies  
 
Volume 2, Number 2, 2014

0 to 20,000 (as a point on the graph 3 9a and Figure 3c), 
but also of income from 5000 to 20000, 10000 to 20000, 
15000 to 20000.
Zhirinovsky remains relevant in high-income areas, 
which suggests that a certain number of supporters of 
Zhirinovsky are present among middle-income voters, 
and among the richest of the voters.
Fig. 10 shows examples of the distribution of population groups with income from Y to X for the Belgorod 
region (Fig. 10a) and in Moscow (Figure 10b). Each point 
on this graph represents the percentage of people (axis 

Z) in the region with an income in the range from Y to 
X. For example, a group of people with incomes between 
20 and 60 thousand rubles (X = 60000, Y = 20000), in the 
Belgorod region corresponds to the value of Z = 24.38 
(i. e. the number of 24.38% of the total population), while 
in Moscow Z = 34.13 (i. e. 34.13% of the total Moscow’s 
population has income of 20 to 60 million).
Thus, the graph 9c coordinate Z (height above the 
plane XY) has the value of F-score statistics regression, 
in which the share of votes for Zhirinovsky explained by 
the proportion of people with income from Y to X.

a) 
b) 

c)  
d) 

Figure 6. The share of votes for Prokhorov (vertical axis) vs. “share of people with incomes less then”:
a) 5000 rubles per month, b) 10 000 rubles per month, c) 20 000 rubles per month, d) 30 000 rubles per month.