Вестник Финансового университета, 2013, № 2(74)

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РЕДАКЦИОННАЯ КОЛЛЕГИЯ
М. А. ФЕДОТОВА — главный редактор,

заслуженный экономист Российской Федерации,

 доктор экономических наук, профессор;

И. Я. ЛУКАСЕВИЧ— заместитель главного редактора, 

доктор экономических наук, профессор;

В. И. АВДИЙСКИЙ, доктор юридических наук, профессор;
М. А. АБРАМОВА, кандидат экономических наук, профессор;
В. А. БАРАНОВ, кандидат юридических наук, доцент;
В. И. БАРИЛЕНКО, доктор экономических наук, профессор;
В. Г. ГЕТЬМАН, доктор экономических наук, профессор;
Л. И. ГОНЧАРЕНКО, доктор экономических наук, профессор;
С. А. ИВАНОВА, доктор юридических наук, профессор;
Н. Г. КОНДРАХИНА, кандидат филологических наук, доцент;
Л. Н. КРАСАВИНА, доктор экономических наук, профессор;
О. И. ЛАВРУШИН, доктор экономических наук, профессор;
Е. В. МАРКИНА, кандидат экономических наук, профессор;
М. В. МЕЛЬНИК, доктор экономических наук, профессор;
Н. П. МЕЛЬНИКОВА, кандидат экономических наук, профессор;
М.В. МЕЛЬНИЧУК, доктор экономических наук, профессор;
Л. А. ОРЛАНЮК-МАЛИЦКАЯ, доктор экономических наук, 
профессор;
Б. Б. РУБЦОВ, доктор экономических наук, профессор;
Г. Ф. РУЧКИНА, доктор юридических наук, профессор;
А. Н. РЯХОВСКАЯ, доктор экономических наук, профессор;
В. Н. САЛИН, кандидат экономических наук, профессор;
Т. В. СЕДОВА, кандидат педагогических наук, доцент;
Д. Е. СОРОКИН, доктор экономических наук, профессор;
А. А. ФАТЬЯНОВ, доктор юридических наук, профессор;
Ю. М. ЦЫГАЛОВ, доктор экономических наук, доцент;
Д. В. ЧИСТОВ, доктор экономических наук, профессор;
И. З. ЯРЫГИНА, доктор экономических наук, профессор

РЕДАКЦИОННЫЙ СОВЕТ

М. А. ЭСКИНДАРОВ — председатель совета,

ректор Финансового университета;

А. У. АЛЬБЕКОВ, ректор Ростовского государственного 
экономического университета (РИНХ);
Р.  Е. АРТЮХИН, руководитель Федерального казначейства 
(Казначейства России), заведующий кафедрой «Финансовое 
право» Финансового университета;
Т. Д. ВАЛОВАЯ, член Коллегии (министр) по основным 
направлениям интеграции и макроэкономике Евразийской 
экономической комиссии;
О. В. ГОЛОСОВ, главный ученый секретарь Финансового 
университета;
В. А. ДМИТРИЕВ, председатель госкорпорации «Банк 
развития и внешнеэкономической деятельности 
(Внешэкономбанк)»;
А. В. ДРОЗДОВ, руководитель Пенсионного фонда 
Российской Федерации;
А. Ю. ЖДАНОВ, член Правления, заместитель Председателя 
Правления ОАО «Россельхозбанк»;
Г. Б. КЛЕЙНЕР, член-корреспондент Российской академии 
наук, заместитель директора ЦЭМИ РАН;
А. А. ЛИБЕТ, член Общественной палаты Российской 
Федерации;
Д. Е. СОРОКИН, член-корреспондент Российской академии 
наук, первый заместитель директора Института экономики РАН;
М. В. ФЕДОРОВ, ректор Уральского государственного 
экономического университета (УрГЭУ-СИНХ);
А. Г. ХЛОПОНИН, заместитель Председателя 
Правительства Российской Федерации – полномочный 
представитель Президента Российской Федерации в 
Северо-Кавказском федеральном округе

МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЙ 

ИЗДАТЕЛЬСКИЙ СОВЕТ

В. АДАМОВ, ректор Хозяйственной академии 
им. Д. А. Ценова (Болгария);
Р. БЕК, профессор Нью-Йоркской школы права, доктор права 
(США);
Д. ВЕБЕР, директор Амстердамского центра налогового 
права Университета Амстердама, доктор права, профессор 
(Нидерланды);
В. ЖИЛЬ, профессор Университета Париж 1 ПантеонСорбонна (Франция);
Д. ЛАФОРДЖИА, ректор Университета Саленто (Италия);
А. МАЗАРАКИ, ректор Киевского национального торговоэкономического университета (Украина);
А. МУЛИНО, директор научного центра Бирмингемского 
университета (Великобритания);
Н. ОРДУЭЙ, профессор Гавайского университета (США);
Я. ОСТАШЕВСКИ, декан факультета управления и финансов 
Варшавской школы экономики (Польша);
Г. ПФЛУГ, декан экономического факультета Венского 
университета (Австрия);
В. САПАТЕРО, ректор Университета Алькала (Испания);
К. ТИТЬЕ, декан факультета экономики, бизнеса и права 
Университета имени Мартина Лютера Галле-Виттенберг, 
доктор наук, профессор (Германия).
Т. ХАЙМЕР, управляющий декан Франкфуртской школы 
финансов и менеджмента (Германия);
С. ХАН, руководитель департамента экономики 
Блумсбергского университета (США);
ЧАН ВЭЙ, президент Ляонинского университета (Китай)

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EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD:

V. ADAMOV, rector, D. A. Tsenov Academy of Economics 
(Bulgaria);
R. BECK, professor, New York Law School (USA)
D. WEBER, director of the Amsterdam Centre for Tax law
 at the University of Amsterdam (Holland);
W. GILLES, professor, University of Paris 1 PantheonSorbonne (France);
D. LAFORGIA, rector, University of Salento (Italy);
A. MAZARAKI, rector, Kyiv National University 
of Trade and Economics (Ukraine);
A. MULLINEUX, director, Birmingham Business School, 
Birmingham University (UK);
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J. OSTASZEWSKI, dean, Management and Finance Faculty, 
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V. ZAPATERO, rector, University of Alcala (Spain);
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T. HEIMER, managing dean, Frankfurt School of Finance 
and Management / University (Germany);
S. KHAN, head, Department of Economics, Bloomsburg 
University (USA); 
CHENG WEI, president, Liaoning University (China).

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD:

M. A. ESKINDAROV — chairman of the Board,

rector, Financial University;

A. U. ALBEKOV, rector, Rostov State University of Economics 
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R. E. ARTUKHIN, head of the Russian Federal Treasury, 
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T. D. VALOVAYA, member of Ministry Board (Minister) for 
principle directions of integration and macroeconomics, 
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O. V. GOLOSOV, chief Academic Secretary, Financial 
University;
V. A. DMITRIEV, chairman, State Corporation «Bank 
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A. YU. ZHDANOV, member of the Board, deputy of Chairman 
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G. B. KLEINER, corresponding Member of Russian Academy 
of Sciences, deputy director, Russian Academy of Sciences 
Central Economics and Mathematics Institute;
A. A. LIBET, Member of the Public Chamber of the Russian 
Federation;
D. E. SOROKIN, corresponding member of Russian Academy 
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Economy Institute;
M. V. FYODOROV, rector, Ural State University of Economics;
A. G. KHLOPONIN, vice premier, the President’s plenipotentiary 
representative in the North Caucasus Federal District

EDITORIAL BOARD:

M. A. FEDOTOVA — editor-in-chief,

Honored Economist of the Russian Federation,

 PhD in Economics, professor;

I. YA. LUKASEVICH —deputy editor-in-chief, 

PhD in Economics, professor;

V. I. AVDIYSKY, PhD in Law, professor;
M. A. ABRAMOVA, candidate of science in Economics, professor;
V. A. BARANOV, candidate of science in Law, docent;
V. I. BARILENKO, PhD in Economics, professor;
V. G. GETIMAN, PhD in Economics, professor;
L.I. GONCHRENKO, PhD in Economics, professor;
S. A. IVANOVA, PhD in Law, professor;
N. G. KONDRAKHINA, candidate of science in Philology, docent;
L. N. KRASAVINA, PhD in Economics, professor;
O. I. LAVROUSHIN, PhD in Economics, professor ;
E. V. MARKINA, candidate of science in Economics, professor;
M. V. MELNIK, PhD in Economics, professor;
N. P. MELNIKOVA, candidate of science in Economics, 
professor;
M. V. MELNICHUK, PhD in Economics, professor;
L. A. ORLANYUK-MALITSKAYA, PhD in Economics, professor;
B. B. RUBTSOV, PhD in Economics, professor;
G. F. RUCHKINA,  PhD in Law, professor;
A. N. RYAHOVSKAYA, PhD in Economics, professor;
V. N. SALIN, candidate of science in Economics, professor;
T. V. SEDOVA, candidate of science in Pedagogics, docent;
D. E. SOROKIN, PhD in Economics, professor;
A. A. FATIANOV, PhD in Law, professor;
YU. M. TSYGALOV, PhD in Economics, docent;
D. V. CHISTOV, PhD in Economics, professor;
I. Z. YARIGINA, PhD in Economics, professor

ВЕСТНИК ФИНАНСОВОГО УНИВЕРСИТЕТА  2’2013

С О Д Е Р Ж А Н И Е

АКТУАЛЬНАЯ ТЕМА

Дэннис Вебер
Нарушение европейского налогового законодательства: обзор и последние тенденции в 
прецедентном праве Европейского Суда в отношении прямых и косвенных налогов (часть 1) ............ 6

ЭКОНОМИКА И УПРАВЛЕНИЕ НАРОДНЫМ ХОЗЯЙСТВОМ

С. О. Календжян, Л. В. Дуканич, О. Е. Лактионова, С. А. Наумова
Аутсорсинговый центр финансовых услуг как фактор инновационного развития регионов .................25

ФИНАНСЫ, ДЕНЕЖНОЕ ОБРАЩЕНИЕ И КРЕДИТ

И. В. Усков
Бюджетная программа — основа программно-целевого планирования .........................................................33

Г. Т. Сапарова
Развитие депозитного сегмента экономики 
в структуре функционирования финансового рынка Казахстана .......................................................................43

МАТЕМАТИЧЕСКИЕ И ИНСТРУМЕНТАЛЬНЫЕ МЕТОДЫ ЭКОНОМИКИ

П. Н. Брусов, Т. В. Филатова, Н. П. Орехова
Отсутствие оптимальной структуры капитала в теории компромисса ..............................................................52

ЮРИДИЧЕСКИЕ НАУКИ

А. М. Воронов, А. М. Гоголев
Государственное администрирование в области налогов и сборов: правовой аспект ..............................65

И. Б. Эйдельман
Источники международно-правового регулирования агентской деятельности в спорте ........................74

ПРОБЛЕМЫ И СУЖДЕНИЯ

А. М. Рахметова
К вопросу о классификации форм взаимодействия банковского 
и реального секторов экономики ......................................................................................................................................80

М. П. Хрипков
Теневая экономика и коррупция .......................................................................................................................................98

ПУБЛИКАЦИИ МОЛОДЫХ УЧЕНЫХ

М. Р. Короева
Государственные и муниципальные учреждения образования и косвенное налогообложение 
их деятельности .....................................................................................................................................................................104

Т. Р. Тимкин
Концептуальные подходы к формированию системы программно-целевого финансирования 
расходов бюджета на здравоохранение ....................................................................................................................112

А. А. Тараканов
Создание конкурентной среды в сфере предоставления государственных услуг ....................................123

Е. А. Домбровский
Доходный потенциал региона и направления его максимизации ..................................................................129

В. С. Седов
Формирование системы исполнения бюджетов государственных социальных фондов
в условиях перехода на кассовое обслуживание в органы Казначейства России ...................................140

BULLETIN OF THE FINANCIAL UNIVERSITY

C O N T E N T S

TOPIC OF THE DAY

Dennis Weber
Abuse of Law in European Tax Law; an Overview and Some Recent Trends in the Direct
and Indirect Tax Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union – Part 1 ............................................. 6

ECONOMICS AND NATIONAL ECONOMY MANAGEMENT

S. O. Kalenjian, l. A. Dukanich, O. E. Laktionova, S. A. Naumova
An Outsorcing Center for Financial Services as a Factor of Innovation Development of Regions ................26

FINANCE, CURRENCY AND CREDIT

I. V. Uskov
Budget-Funded Program Assessment as an Approach to Performance-Based Planning .................................34

G. T. Saparova
Development of the Deposit Segment of The Economy in the Kazakhstan
Financial Market Environment ..............................................................................................................................................44

MATHEMATICAL AND INSTRUMENTAL METHODS IN ECONOMICS

P. N. Brusov, T. V. Filatova, N. P. Orekhova
The Absence of the Optimal Capital Structure in the Trade Off Theory .................................................................53

JURIDICAL SCIENCES

A. M. Voronov,  A. M. Gogolev
The State Administration in the Field of Taxes and Fees: Legal Aspect .................................................................68

I. B. Eydelman
International Legal Framework to Regulate Sports Agents’ Activities ....................................................................74

ISSUES AND OPINIONS

А. М. Rakhmetova
On the Classification of Forms of Interaction Between the Banking
and the Real Sectors of the Economy .................................................................................................................................81

M. P. Khripkov
Shadow Economy and Corruption ........................................................................................................................................98

PUBLICATIONS OF YOUNG SCIENTISTS

M. R. Koroeva
Federal and Local Educatonal Establishments and Indirect Taxation
of Their Activities ....................................................................................................................................................................105

T. R. Timkin
Conceptual Approaches to Building a Result-Oriented System
for Government Funding of Healthcare Projects .........................................................................................................112

A. A. Tarakanov
Creation of Competition in the Public Services Delivery Sphere ...........................................................................124

E. A. Dombrovskiy
Income Potential of a Region and Direction for Its Maximization ........................................................................130

V. S. Sedov
Formation of the Budget of Public Social Funds Execution System
in Transition to Settlement Services in Russian Treasury .........................................................................................141

ВЕСТНИК ФИНАНСОВОГО УНИВЕРСИТЕТА  2’2013

АКТУАЛЬНАЯ ТЕМА

УДК 34.03:336.22(4)

НАРУШЕНИЕ ЕВРОПЕЙСКОГО НАЛОГОВОГО 
ЗАКОНОДАТЕЛЬСТВА: ОБЗОР И ПОСЛЕДНИЕ 
ТЕНДЕНЦИИ В ПРЕЦЕДЕНТНОМ ПРАВЕ ЕВРОПЕЙСКОГО 
СУДА В ОТНОШЕНИИ ПРЯМЫХ И КОСВЕННЫХ НАЛОГОВ 
(ЧАСТЬ 1)

ДЭННИС М. ВЕБЕР
доктор права, профессор кафедры Европейского корпоративного налогового права Амстердамского университета, 
директор Амстердамского центра налогового права, Амстердам, Нидерланды
E-mail: Dennis.weber@loyensloeff.com

АННОТАЦИЯ

В статье рассматривается право государств — членов ЕС бороться с нарушениями законодательства, 
которое определяется в прецедентном праве Европейского Суда как баланс между соблюдением 
принципа правовой определенности, правом выбора наиболее благоприятного налогового режима и 
правом государств бороться с уклонением от уплаты налогов. В первой части статьи рассматриваются 
субъективные и объективные критерии для установления злоупотреблений, концепция экономической 
реальности по сравнению с полностью искусственными структурами, идея общего принципа коммунитарного права и различные уровни злоупотребления.

Ключевые слова. нарушение; уклонение от уплаты налогов; искусственные структуры; общий принцип права в ЕС; выбор налоговой юрисдикции.

ABUSE OF LAW IN EUROPEAN TAX LAW; AN OVERVIEW 
AND SOME RECENT TRENDS IN THE DIRECT AND 
INDIRECT TAX CASE LAW OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF 
THE EUROPEAN UNION – PART 1

DENNIS M. WEBER
PhD (law), Professor, Chair European Corporate Tax Law, University of Amsterdam;
Director, Amsterdam Centre for Tax law (ACTL), Amsterdam, Holland
E-mail: Dennis.weber@loyensloeff.com

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the right of the EU Member States to combat abuse, as defined in the case law of the 
European Court, in particular, the balance between enforcement of the principle of legal certainty, the right 
to choose the most favourable fiscal route and the right of states to combat tax avoidance. Part 1 addresses 
the subjective and objective tests for establishing abuse, the concept of economic reality v. wholly artificial 
arrangements, the idea of a general principle of community law and the different levels of abuse.

Key words: abuse; tax avoidance; artificial structures; general principle of EU-law; tax jurisdiction shopping.

АКТУАЛЬНАЯ ТЕМА

1. GENERAL

1.1. Introduction — points of assumption
According to the case law of the Court, the 

Member States have the possibility, also under 
Community law, to combat abuse. In addition to 
the specific conditions with which this combating of abuse will have to comply in various areas 
of law, there are a number of general preconditions to the combating of abuse. First, I should 
like to refer to ECJ 12 May 1998, case C-367/96 
(Kefalas), ECR I-2843 in which the Court reminded that:

‘the application of such a national rule must 

not prejudice the full effect and uniform application of Community law in the Member States 
(…). In particular, it is not open to national 
courts, when assessing the exercise of a right 
arising from a provision of Community law, to 
alter the scope of that provision or to compromise the objectives pursued by it’.

In addition, it is important to recognise that 

the principle of legal certainty is the starting 
point in the application of the law. This principle 
entails that rules of law must be made known and 
that situations of law governed by the Community law must be foreseeable. One consequence 
of this is that it must be possible for a taxpayer to 
choose the fiscal means most favourable to him 
on the basis of Community law known to him. In 
the VAT case law, the Court has acknowledged 
choosing the most favourable fiscal means (‘the 
most favourable tax route principle’) a number 
of times. In ECJ 21 February 2006, case C-255/02, 
(Halifax) it was considered (para. 73):

‘Moreover, it is clear from the case-law that a 

trader’s choice between exempt transactions and 
taxable transactions may be based on a range 
of factors, including tax considerations relating to the VAT system (see, in particular, BLP 
Group, paragraph 26, and Case C-108/99 Cantor Fitzgerald International [2001] ECR I-7257, 
paragraph 33). Where the taxable person chooses one of two transactions, the Sixth Directive 
does not require him to choose the one which 
involves paying the highest amount of VAT. On 
the contrary, as the Advocate General observed 
in point 85 of his Opinion, taxpayers may choose 
to structure their business so as to limit their tax 
liability’.

The principle of legal certainty entails that if 

a taxpayer can rely on (can foresee) the fact that 
if he is eligible for a certain tax advantage, he 
can also make use of this. The principle of legal 
certainty can only be set aside if there is a matter 
of abuse. The abuser, namely, can no longer rely 
on the foreseeability of the law.

In every situation, a balance will have to be 

found between enforcement of the principle of 
legal certainty, the right arising therefrom to 
choose the most favourable fiscal course, and 
combating tax avoidance. Finding this balance, 
however, is not an easy task.

2. OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE TESTS
2.1. General
It follows from ECJ 14 December 2000, case 

C-110/99 (Emsland-Stärke) that abuse of Community law must be established on the basis of i) the 
objective circumstances from which it appears that 
the envisioned objective of the Community law 
cannot be attained (objective test); and ii) the subjective abuse intention (subjective test).

The Court has also used this test in tax law. In 

the area of VAT, see ECJ 21 February 2006, case 
C-255/02, (Halifax). With regard to the Capital 
Tax Directive,1 see ECJ 7 June 2007, case C-178/05 
(Commission v Greece) ECR I-4185, and for direct 
taxation see ECJ 12 September 2006, case C-196/04 
(Cadbury Schweppes).

2.1.1. Objective test
With respect to the objective test with regard 

to abuse, in Emsland-Stärke the Court required ‘a 
combination of objective circumstances in which, 
despite formal observance of the conditions laid 
down by the Community rules, the purpose of 
those rules has not been achieved’. Under the objective test, there should be awareness that in principle — on the basis of the letter of the law — a 
taxpayer has a right to a favourable treatment. If 
however, the objective circumstances are assessed 
in the light of the objective of the applicable Community law, then the conclusion can be reached that 
the envisioned objective has not been attained on 
account of the rule. In such a situation, this could 
constitute abuse, and this is often described by the 
Court such that the objective circumstances do not 

1 Directive 69/335/EEC of the Council of 17 July 1969 concerning the indirect taxes on the raising of capital, OJ L 249/25.

ВЕСТНИК ФИНАНСОВОГО УНИВЕРСИТЕТА  2’2013

mean ‘bona fide commercial transactions’ or ‘normal commercial operations’; ‘create artificial conditions’ or ‘wholly artificial arrangements’. In VAT 
cases, the Court considers that abuse is not present 
in the case of ‘normal commercial operations’. In 
the VAT case Weald leasing,2 the Court ruled that 
for the question what were normal commercial 
transactions, the nature of the commercial operations which the taxpayer was usually engaged was 
not what was important, but only object and effects 
of the specific transactions in question, as well as 
their purpose (see para. 43 and 44 of Weald leasing). 
In Weald Leasing, the AG considered the question 
what ‘normal commercial operations for that matter under the subjective abuse test’ (see below on 
the test), the CJ, however, deals with the question 
under the objective abuse test.

The objective test, whereby the objective circum
stances must be qualified in the light of the objective 
of Community law, is in fact basically an interpretation of the Community law, for which in the first 
instance, the Court has jurisdiction. In this framework, if necessary, the national court will thus have 
to refer preliminary questions to the Court about 
the objective of the relevant Community law.3

2.1.2. Subjective test
The Court describes the subjective test in 

Emsland-Stärke as ‘the intention to obtain an advantage from the Community rules by creating artificially the conditions laid down for obtaining it’.

For the question whether restrictions on the free 

movement can be justified on the ground of prevention of abusive practices, the CJ considers in direct 
taxation cases: ‘the specific objective of such a restriction must be to prevent conduct involving the 
creation of wholly artificial arrangements which do 
not reflect economic reality, with a view to escaping 
the tax normally due on the profits generated by activities carried out on national territory’ (Cadbury 
Schweppes, para. 55). The CJ emphasises hereby 
that the existence of tax motives do not imply that 
abuse is present given that an economic reality can 
still be present (Cadbury Schweppes, para. 65).

2 CJ 22 December 2010, case C-103/09, H&I 2011/3.10 (comments by de la 
Feira).
3 See also: A. Kjellgren, On the border of abuse: The European Court of Justice on circumvention, fraud and other misuses of Community law, EBLR 
2000, p. 190; D. M. Weber, Tax avoidance and the EC treaty freedoms, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation Vol 11, Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague, 2005, p. 186 and L. De Broe, International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse, Volume 14, Doctoral Series, IBFD, Amsterdam, 2008, p. 756.

In VAT cases, the description of the subjective 

element is different. In Weald leasing, for example, 
the CJ considered (para. 30): ‘it must also be apparent from a number of objective factors that the 
essential aim of the transactions concerned is to obtain a tax advantage. The prohibition of abuse is not 
relevant where the economic activity carried out 
may have some explanation other than the mere attainment of tax advantages’, here referring to cases 
such as Part Services and Halifax.

If a person does not openly disclose that he is 

trying to avoid the national legislation via invoking Community law, his actual intention will have 
to be derived from the objective circumstances (the 
objectified intention).4 The artificiality of a transaction would thus have to be able to be redirected to a 
subjective abuse intention of a person.

Accordingly, when applying both the objective 

test and the subjective test, the objective circumstances will often have to be examined. The result 
is that these two tests can become somewhat intertwined and sometimes, can be difficult to separate 
from each other (see also paragraph 2.1.4).5

In my view, the case law of the Court deals with 

the subjective intention of a person. In his Opinion in Halifax, AG Maduro remarked, ‘the finding 
of artificiality should not be based on an assessment of the subjective intentions of [the persons] 
(….) claiming the Community right. The artificial 
nature of certain events or transactions must certainly be determined on the basis of a set of objective circumstances verified in each individual 
case’. According to AG Maduro, the intention of 
the activity should be examined, not the intention 
of the persons (who perform the activities). ‘What 
matters is not the state of mind of [a person], but 
the fact that the activity, objectively speaking, has 
no other explanation but to secure a tax advantage’. 
Many agree with AG Maduro on this point,6 and in 
Halifax, in the test regarding the subjective intention, the Court mentioned the ‘essential aim of the 
transactions’ (para 75 from Halifax). This does not 
mean, however, in my view, that only the intention 
of the activity should be examined and thus the intention of the persons (who perform the activity/

4 Compare also AG Maduro in his Opinion to the joined cases C-255/02, 
C-419/02 and C-223/03, (Halifax), pt. 70.

5 Thus under both tests, the Court often mentions the ‘artificiality’ of a construction. 

6 See for instance: L. De Broe, International Tax Planning and Prevention of 
Abuse, Volume 14, Doctoral Series, IBFD, Amsterdam, 2008, p. 765.

АКТУАЛЬНАЯ ТЕМА

instruct it) is irrelevant. In my opinion, this should 
be the other way round: first, you must examine 
the subjective intention of persons, however, given 
that you often do not know or may have doubts as 
to what the subjective intention of a certain person 
is, (a person may deny that he has an intention to 
abuse), in such a case, the objective circumstances 
(the activity) must be examined. The subjective intention of the person should be able to be discerned 
from these objective circumstances, which is what 
I call the ‘objectified intention’. Worthy of remark 
is that sometimes a person is open about his intentions. Take, for example, the Centros case. The persons (shareholders) of the company incorporated 
according to UK law were open about their intentions. The Court established that the statement that 
the incorporation of the UK company for the purpose of avoiding application of Danish legislation 
on the formation of private limited companies had 
not been denied by the shareholders, either in the 
written observations or at the hearing (see para. 
16–18 of Centros). In other words: the subjective 
intention of avoiding the national legislation had 
been established. In such a case, the subjective intention does not have to be examined on the basis 
of the objective circumstances.

In practice, however, I suspect that my opinion 

and that of AG Maduro are not so very different. 
We are both seeking the subjective intention. We 
both will often examine the objective circumstances, although only I attribute the intention that can 
be derived from the objective circumstances to the 
persons who perform the activities (the ultimate 
entitled parties). It is also the persons (the taxpayers) who ultimately enjoy the tax advantage, the 
activities themselves do not enjoy a tax advantage7.

It has been pointed out that other to Emsland
Stärke,8 in VAT cases (Halifax) (and later also con
7 The Netherlands Supreme Court, for example, clearly based itself in HR 10 
February 2012, no. 08/05317 (Ziekenhuisconstructie), V-N 2012/12.23 on 
objective circumstances to subsequently find out the subjective intention of 
the parties (see: para 3.5.2 of the judgment). See also: HR 10 February 2012, 
no. 09/03203 (Ziekenhuisconstructie), V-N 2012/13.20, para. 3.5.2. To me, 
that seems to be a correct approach.
8 In Emsland-Stärke, the Court points out that the evidence of the subjective 
element particularly can be delivered ‘by evidence of collusion between the 
Community exporter receiving the refunds and the importer of the goods in 
the non-member country. In Emsland-Stärke, products were exported from 
the EU and immediately re-imported (immediately after having cleared customs, in an unchanged condition and with the same means of transport) 
for the purpose of obtaining an export refund which was higher than the 
import duty. Apparently, in order not to appear all too obvious in taking this 
U-turn, before being re-imported into the EU, a number of consignments of 
products were sold to another company which subsequently imported (on 
paper) them into the EU. By being sold and purchased in the non-member 

firmed in cases such as Part services, RBS 
Deutschland and Weald Leasing) under the subjective test, the CJ does not explicitly require that 
there be a matter of artificiality. The Court has remarked in, amongst others, Halifax, that in order 
to find out what the subjective intention is, ‘it may 
take account of the purely artificial nature of those 
transactions and the links of a legal, economic and/
or personal nature between the operators involved 
in the scheme for reduction of the tax burden’. The 
subjective intention can be derived from the artificiality but it is not a condition as such. There can 
also be a matter of abuse when no artificial element 
is present.9 That could be present, for example, in a 
situation in which there is no question of artificiality, but there is an activity between affiliated bodies. 
Although the finding in earlier VAT case law that 
the CJ does not require the condition of artificiality, 
in more recent case law, it must be found that the CJ 
does consider artificiality decisive to the question 
whether the subjective test has been satisfied. We 
see this, for example, in RBS Deutschland.10 In that 
case, the Court considered (paras 50 and 51): ‘As 
regards the facts at issue in the main proceedings 
in the present case, it should be noted that the various transactions concerned took place between two 
parties which were legally unconnected. It is also 
common ground that those transactions were not 
artificial in nature and that they were carried out in 
the context of normal commercial operations’. As 
the national court has observed, the characteristics 
of the transactions at issue in the main proceedings 
and the nature of the relations between the companies that carried out those transactions contain 
nothing to suggest an artificial arrangement that does 
not reflect economic reality and the sole aim of which 

country, it appeared as if the goods had in fact been traded and that there 
was no question of abuse. It must be pointed out however, that the companies which sold and bought the goods were established in the non-member 
country at the same address and were managed and represented by the same 
persons. According to para. 58 in the Emsland-Stärke judgment, the Court 
ruled that the circumstance that ‘before being re-imported into the Community the product was resold by the purchaser established in the non-member 
country concerned to an undertaking also established in that country with 
which it has personal and commercial links (…). (…) is one of the factual 
elements which can be taken into account by the national court to establish 
the artificial nature of the operation concerned. In essence, the question of 
transactions between apparently connected persons is whether an activity of 
an artificial nature has taken place. 
9 See: A. Peeters, De vrije keuze van de minst belaste weg bekeken vanuit 
een Europeesrectelijk perspectief, Algemeen Fiscaal Tijdschrift, 2011/10, p. 
17 and B. Kiekebeld, Anti-abuse in the field of taxation: is there an overall 
concept, EC Tax Review 2009/4, p. 144–145.

10 CJ 22 December 2010, C-277/09 (RBS Deutschland), H&I 2011/3.9 (comments by Lambion).

ВЕСТНИК ФИНАНСОВОГО УНИВЕРСИТЕТА  2’2013

is to obtain a tax advantage (see, to that effect, Case 
C-162/07 Ampliscientifica and Amplifin [2008] ECR 
I-4019, paragraph 28), since RBSD is a company established in Germany carrying on business providing banking and leasing services’ (italics by author). 
It appears from RBS Deutschland, therefore, that in 
practice, the Court does seek the artificiality under 
the subjective requirement and when this is not the 
case, there is no question of abuse. We see the same 
approach in the Opinion of AG Mazak in Weald 
leasing where he observed that there is no question 
of abuse, despite the fact that the transaction took 
place with a subsidiary, given that the same advantage can be obtained by entering into an agreement 
under normal commercial conditions with an independent third party. The entering into a transaction 
with affiliated bodies thus only constitutes abuse if 
a certain artificiality is present. It must be remarked 
that in Foggia11 (concerning the tax merger directive) the Court does not emphasise the artificiality 
of the transaction.12

Finally, I note that the discovering of the subjec
tive intention is an issue of fact which, in the first 
instance, is left to the national court. This national 
court will have to establish what the subjective intention is.13 This, thus, is different when applying 
the objective test, whereby the Court would be the 
designated judicial body in the first instance to determine the scope and goal of the relevant Community law.

2.1.3. Only tax avoidance when there is a tax ad
vantage

In Halifax, the Court considers that abuse is 

present when it ‘results in the accrual of a tax advantage the grant of which would be contrary to 
the purpose of those provisions’ (para. 74) and that 
in addition, also present must be ‘that the essential 
aim of the transactions concerned is to obtain a tax 
advantage’ (para. 75). In Cadbury Schweppes, the 
Court mentions abuse ‘with a view to escaping the 

11 CJ 10 November 2011, C-126/10, (Foggia), H&I 2012/6.1 (comments by 
da Silva).

12 See on this: A. M. Jiménez, Towards a homogeneous theory of abuse in EU 
(direct) tax law, Bulletin 2012, p. 284. This could be linked to the fact that 
the anti-abuse provision in the merger directive places emphasis on ‘valid 
commercial reasons’.
13 In Emsland-Stärke, the referring court (Finanzgericht Hamburg) concluded that on the basis of the facts, the subjective test had not been satisfied and 
thus, there was no question of abuse. See P. Koutrakos, Movement of goods, 
Emsland-Stärke and the abuse of law test, published in ‘Prohibition of abuse 
of law — a new general principle of EU law, edited by R. de la Feria and 
S. Vogenauer, Hart publishing, Oxford, 2009.

tax normally due on the profits generated by activities carried out on national territory’ (para. 55). It 
appears from this judgments that abuse can only be 
called into question in the case of less (or no) payment of tax (hereafter, in brief, ‘tax advantage’). The 
question that can be asked is whether a structure 
which provides only a financing advantage for the 
taxpayer and not a tax advantage can be labelled 
as abuse. One example in the scope of VAT is the 
situation in which an entrepreneur decides to lease 
and not to buy a good. Assume that this is a taxpayer not entitled to deduct VAT; when this taxpayer 
buys a good, the VAT is non-deductible at once, if 
the taxpayer decides to lease or hire out the good, 
the VAT is not deductible from the lease amounts. 
On balance, the same amount of VAT is paid, only 
the taxpayer has a financial advantage. The issue in 
the Weald leasing case14 was the difference between 
a tax advantage and a financing advantage.15 In his 
Opinion, AG Mazák dwelt on the fact that deferment of VAT payment (thus a financing advantage) 
in itself was not abuse (see: point 20 of his Opinion), 
but did not come to a clear conclusion that a financing advantage as such was not a tax advantage. The 
same applies to the Court. The Court even takes the 
position that in a financing advantage, there is a tax 
advantage; in para. 31, namely, the court considers: 
‘As regards the main proceedings, the decision making the reference states that the essential aim of the 
leasing transactions at issue in the main proceedings 
was to obtain a tax advantage, namely spreading the 
payment of the VAT on the purchases in question, 
so as to defer the Churchill Group’s VAT liability’. 
Subsequently, the Court came to the conclusion that 
this tax advantage was not contrary to the objective
of the VAT Directive (para. 34): ‘A taxable person 
cannot be criticised for choosing a leasing transaction which procures him an advantage consisting, as 
is apparent from the decision making the reference, 
in spreading the payment of his tax liability, rather 
than a purchase transaction which does not procure 
him any such advantage, provided that the VAT on 
that leasing transaction is duly and fully paid’. As 
substantiation of this decision, the Court observed 

14 CJ 22 December 2010, case C-103/09, H&I 2011/3.10 (comments by de 
la Feira).
15 See in this framework, also the Opinion of AG Van Hilten in HR 10 February 2012, no. 08/05317 (Ziekenhuisconstructie), V-N 2012/12.23 and on 
Weald Leasing: Opinion of Van Hilten in HR 30 March 2012, no. 09/03079 
(Gemeente Middelharnis), FED 2012/69 para. 7.4.2. and further an Opinion 
of Van Hilten in HR 10 February 2012, no. 09/03203 (Ziekenhuisconstructie), V-N 2012/13.20, para. 6.4.3.